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Abstract 
For over 2500 years disease organisms have been used as weapons. 
Bioterrorism remains the greatest national security threat to our country. 
Bioweapons are highly lethal, easily accessible, inexpensive, and with the 
advances in biotechnology, the ability to alter pathogens into more virulent strains 
could make bioterrorism agents even more difficult to fight. 
In June of2001, The Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense 
Strategies partnered with other non-military agencies to simulate a national 
security response to a bioterrorist attack. After the exercise was reviewed by the 
Hopkins Center, the conclusions reached included significant deficiencies in the 
United States' ability to manage a bioterrorist attack. A major deficiency is the 
' 
weak infrastructure of the Public Health System. 
As a specialty in public health, occupational health nurses can play a key 
role in the detection of a disease outbreak associated with a bioterrorism attack. 
But frrst, they must be knowledgeable about common bioterrorism pathogens and 
T 
use epidemiological principles to monitor for unusual patterns of illness that could 
indicate an outbreak. In addition, they must network with local public 
departments and report unusual fmdings to local and state public health 
authorities inunediately. t--
r 
Occupational health nurses must exercise their roles as leaders, providing 
' 
guidance to administrators for the development of policies to address bioterrorism L 
threats in the workplace, training programs for emergency response, reporting 
procedures for staff, and educational materials and straight foreword information 
for workers. 
This paper will serve to familiarize the occupational health nurse with 
bioterrorism agents mostly likely to be used as weapons of mass destruction and 
to describe the occupational health implications ofbioterrorism on the workforce 
and at the workplace. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
"Weapon of mass destruction" (WMD) is a term that describes a single 
weapon that can cause damage equal to hundreds or thousands of conventional 
explosive or incendiary weapons (U.S. Congress Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1993). For example, nuclear weapons are weapons of mass 
destruction, but even before these sophisticated and technologically advanced 
weapons were discovered, weapons of mass destruction existed. Chemical 
weapons such as mustard gas were used during World War I and World War II, 
and continued to be used as recently as the 1990s Gulf War (ASTDR, 1995). 
Even before World War I, bacteria and viruses (or the toxins they release), were 
used as weapons. Opposing armies used bacteria and viruses to cause illness and 
death centuries before they were formally identified. This method of warfare- the 
malicious incitement of disease- is known as bioterrorism (Leder berg, 1997). The 
National Institutes of Health (2002) defines bioterrorism as "the use of 
microorganisms that cause human disease, or the toxins released from them, to 
harm people or elicit widespread fear or intimidation of society." 
While the use of WMD is not new, events in the Middle East over the last 
decade have heightened concern regarding vulnerability to attacks of this sort. 
During The Gulf War in the early 1990s Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, had an 
arsenal containing the chemical weapons mustard gas, sarin, and tabun. He used 
one of these weapons against the Kurds in his own country (CNN, 1991). At the 
end of the Gulf War, several American servicemen complained of vague and 
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mysterious symptoms. There were some who thought that these symptoms were 
due to a chemical weapons attack on U.S. troops that occurred during the Gulf 
War. L 
While the symptoms experienced by the Gulf War veterans increased our 
concern about WMD, they didn't cause panic for most of the country because the 
episode occurred distantly and the thought that an attack would ever take place on 
American soil was unimaginable. However, on September 11, 2001, America 
L 
was attacked on home soil. Two highjacked airliners were used to strike the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. A third highjacked airliner 
was used to strike the Pentagon, a fourth airliner crashed in Pennsylvania as 
passengers fought highjackers, preventing them from carrying out their I presumably similar plan on the White House or U.S. Capital. Approximately 
3,000 people were killed and 7,000 injured in those attacks (Jacobson eta!., 
2002). A Middle Eastern terrorist organization known as the AI Qaeda network 
claimed responsibility for the September 11th attacks. 
Between October and November of2001, 10 confirmed cases of 
inhalation anthrax were diagnosed in Washington, D.C., New York City, New 
York, Boca Raton, Florida, and Trenton, New Jersey. The anthrax was spread by 
spore-containing letters that were sent through the mail to U.S. Senators and ;, __ 
r--
media personalities. Anthrax spores were found in several governmental and 
postal facilities and most victims were exposed as letters were processed through 
the postal system. Potential exposures numbered in the thousands (Jackson et a!., 
2002). 
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to inspect Iraq for WMD and have been met with resistance from both Iraq itself 
and the United Nations Security Council. However, on November 8, 2002, the 
United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution calling for 
reentry for inspections for WMD. On November 13, 2002, the Iraqi government 
reluctantly agreed to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to their 
country. "In their nine-page letter, however, the Iraqis seethed with hostility 
toward the United States, and repeatedly denied President Bush's assertions that 
they have weapons of mass destruction, setting the stage for further confrontation 
between Washington and Baghdad" (Preston, 2002). As the situation in the 
Middle East becomes more tenuous, the American public contemplates the 
Access to information pertaining to bioweapons is vital for the medical I likelihood of further attacks. 
and public health communities to prepare for a bioterrorism attack. Without it the 
medical community will not be prepared to respond with appropriate diagnostic 
tests and treatments and the public health community will not be infrastructurally 
prepared and able to adequately initiate contingency safety and security plans. 
In light of the various illnesses and manifestations these bioweapons can 
cause, the agencies, organizations, and researchers with knowledge regarding 
bioweapons recommend that health care providers and health care workers t-
' 
become familiar with signs and symptoms of the diseases caused by biological 
weapons, and related diagnostic and management procedures (Woods & Ashford, 
2001; CDC, 2001c; Vastag, 2001; Reiman & Olson 2002). 
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While we know who was behind the hijacking of the four airliners 
causing the World Trade Center (WTC), Pentagon, and Pennsylvania tragedies, 
almost a year later the origin of the anthrax letters is still unknown. However, the 
combination of these attacks gave Americans a new fear: weapons of mass 
destruction at home. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, private citizens 
L 
purchased gas masks and other personal protective equipment. 
The military has been researching the risks of a bioterrorism attack for 
decades. The United States Army Medical Research Institute ofinfectious 
Disease (USAMRIID) conducts research to develop vaccines, drugs, and 
diagnostics for potential bioterrorism pathogens. USAMRIID has also produced a 
reference manual of potential bioweapons that includes prophylactic treatment I and management ofbioweapon victims. In addition to the military research, 
organizations such as the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense 
Strategies, the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) have performed research and disaster exercises to increase knowledge 
about America's preparedness for an attack (USARMIID, 2002). 
Since the terrorist attacks in the fall of2001, relations between the United 
States and many Middle Eastern countries have become strained. The U.S. fought 
in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, an oppressive government who also aided the 
AI Qaeda network in their attacks. Pakistan's government was cautious in its 
response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the Iraqi government expressed 
pleasure at the attack on America (Sanger, 2001 ). America has demanded access 
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Becoming familiar with the most common biological weapon agents, 
modes of transmission, appropriate isolation precautions, incubation periods, and 
exposure symptoms, OHNs will be in a position to recognize patterns of 
symptoms that could signal a disease outbreak. The OHN will have the necessary 
information to report information to public health authorities responsible for 
outbreak investigation. Further, OHNs can implement emergency procedures 
including post-exposure prophylaxis, treatment, and isolation precautions when 
appropriate. In this manner the OHN can play a key role in early detection and 
contaimnent of a disease outbreak. 
This paper focuses on how occupational health nurses (OHNs) can 
maximize their roles utilizing the broad background unique to occupational health 
nursing in order to assist in the monitoring for and detection of unusual patterns of 
illness associated with a bioterrorist attack. 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OurBREAK 6 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Historical Examples of Bioterrorism 
Examples of the use of disease producing organisms to intentionally cause 
death and illness date back centuries. Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, & Eitzen, 
(1997) describe an early use of disease as a weapon. In the 1300s, the Tatars (an 
army of Mongols and Turks) attacked the Genoese settlers at the seaport ofKaffa 
on the Crimean peninsula (Encyclopedia.com, 2002). When plague infected the 
Tatars, they used it to their advantage by catapulting the bodies of plague-infected 
soldiers into the city. The Tatars took Kaffa, and the Genoese infected with 
plague, retreated from the city by sea and sailed to various ports throughout the 
Mediterranean. That episode is thought to have contributed to a pandemic 
outbreak of plague throughout Europe (Christopher et a!., 1997). 
During the French and Indian Wars (1754-1767), British Commander Sir 
Jeffrey Amherst proposed the use of disease in reducing unfriendly American 
native tribes. The soldiers had suffered an outbreak of smallpox. Blankets 
contaminated with the virus were given to the American natives with the intent of 
stimulating a smallpox outbreak among them (Christopher eta!., 1997). 
According to the University of Alabama at Birmingham (2001), some tribes 
suffered a mortality rate as high as 50% during the outbreaks. Shenold (2001) 
states that this same strategy had been used by Pizarro in South America during 
the 15th century. 
! 
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Many countries began to research biological weapons prior to and during 
World War II. The Japanese military experimented with plague and anthrax 
among other pathogens for use as weapons at Unit 731, a biological warfare 
research facility located near the town ofPingfan. The center of the Japanese 
biological weapons development program, Pingfan, contained 150 buildings, 5 
satellite camps, and a staff of more than 3000 scientists and technicians. 
Prisoners were intentionally infected with a variety of pathogens. Between the 
years of 1932 and 1945, 10,000 prisoners died in the Japanese program at Unit 
731 (Christopher eta!., 1997). 
The United States began a biological weapons program in 1942 that 
continued through the Korean War and the Cold War. The program included a 
research and development facility at Camp Detrick, Maryland, testing sites in 
Mississippi and Utah, and a production facility in Terre Haute, Indiana. The U.S. 
program was expanded during the Korean War and included a program to develop 
countermeasures, including vaccines, anti-sera, and therapeutic agents to protect 
U.S. troops from possible biological attack (Christopher eta!., 1997). 
By the late 1960s, the U.S. military had developed a biological arsenal that 
included Bacillis anthracis, Botulinum toxin, Francisella tularensis, Brucella suis, 
Coxiella burnetii, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B, Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
virus, Rice blast, wheat stem rust and rye stem rust (Christopher et al., 1997). 
In 1969 and 1970, President Richard Nixon ordered an end to America's 
biological weapons program. In 1971 the U.S.'s offensive biological stockpile 
i ;-
i 
L 
L 
' 
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was destroyed. The "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction" was developed in 1972. This was a treaty that was signed by more 
than 100 countries. In spite of the treaty, several participatory countries, 
including Iraq continue to attempt to develop biological weapons (Christopher et 
al., 1997). In 1979 an outbreak of anthrax occurred in Russia as the result of an 
accidental release of anthrax spores from a biological weapons research facility 
L 
there. The outbreak killed 66 of the 77 people who became ill (Christopher et al.). 
Modern Events of Concern 
Although the government oflraq denies use of biological weapons during I the Gulf War, they do admit to having had a biological weapons arsenal during 
the Gulf War (Christopher et al., 1997). As shown in table 2.1, it is postulated 
that several other countries have biological weapons, although one can only 
speculate on what bioweapons a given country possesses. "It's hard to know 
exactly what a country has in the way of specific bioweapons- they really don't 
want a potential adversary to know or they might be able to counter the weapon" 
(Dr. Nelson Couch, personal communication, November 15, 2002). 
Cult followers ofBhagwan Shree Rajneesh contaminated drinking glasses L 
and salad bars with sahnonella bacteria in Oregon in 1984. Although there were 
no deaths from this attack, over 750 people became ill with symptoms of 
sahnonella poisoning (Begley, 2001 ). 
By November of2001, the anthrax spores sent through the U.S. Postal 
system resulted in 22 known cases of anthrax with 10 confirmed cases of 
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inhalation anthrax and 12 confirmed cases of cutaneous anthrax (CDC, 2001 e). 
These cases resulted in five deaths (Candiotti, 2002) with the remaining 
individuals treated for inhalation anthrax. Five of these cases were postal workers L 
who, as of May 2002, had not returned to work due to complaints of continued 
illness and fatigue. The remaining victim, a 74-year-old Florida man, has 
returned to work at the tabloid newspaper where the first anthrax victim died 
("Victim expresses frustration," 2002). 
In addition, U.S. officials remain suspicious that Iraq maintains a 
biological weapons arsenal, although as previously stated, the Iraqi govermnent 
has finally agreed to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to their 
country (Preston, 2002). 
The Greatest National Security Threat 
According to Tara J. O'Toole, MD, MPH, Director of the Johns Hopkins 
University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies (2002), bioterrorism is the 
greatest national security threat for several reasons: 
• lethality 
• ease of access 
• fmancial feasibility 
• advances in biotechnology 
The frrst reason is that bioweapons are highly lethal. The Office of 
Technology Assessment (now closed) estimated in 1993 that 100 kilograms of 
anthrax could kill between 130,000 and 3 million people depending on 
population, weather conditions, and other variables (Henderson, 2001). 
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Table 2.1 
Countries Suspected of Harboring Biological Weapons 
I ~~lg=ia JLaos ........... H I 
I ~hi11a .J~ibya .. .I 
I ln~a . [SouthAfrica 
11rJn I SouthKorea ............ . L 
r~~~~... t:.; -] 
(From Cole 1996, Garrett, 2001 as cited in Gwerder, Beaton, & Daniell, 2001) I 
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Reiman and Olson (2002) discuss a second reason for the increased threat 
attributable to a bioweapons attack as the ease of accessibility of these agents: 
"They are also easy to obtain (with more than 400 strain repositories 
around the world, in addition to clinical microbiology laboratories), easy 
to produce (most undergraduate, graduate and postdoctoral students in 
microbiology and related fields have the necessary background), easy to 
conceal, and are becoming increasingly easy to deliver" (p. 25). 
Danzig and Berkowsky (1997) discuss a third reason that ranks 
bioterrorism as a significant threat to national security; it is an effective tactic 
even for "small groups of people with modest fmances." Reiman and Olson 
I 
r 
(2002) referred to bioweapons as the "poor man's atomic bomb." Because of the 
potential for large numbers of fatalities, enemies who have an inferior military 
force may still feel confident in attacking larger, superior armies. 
A fourth and particularly frightening factor that makes bioterrorism a 
major threat to national security centers on recent advances in biotecimology. 
Scientists can now create the Ebola virus from "scratch," that is, from non-living 
material (O'Toole, 2002). It is equally frightening to consider creation of more 
virulent strains of pathogens that already exist. Consider the case of the 
Australian scientists who, in early 2001, caused the mutation of a rodent virus: 
"The lethal mouse virus was the unintended creation of investigators at the 
Co-operative Research Centre (CRC) for the Biological Control of Pest 
Animals, Canberra. The researchers, who were attempting to create a 
contraceptive vaccine to be used for pest control, used mousepox virus as 
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a vector to introduce genes for mouse egg proteins into mice for the 
purpose of stimulating anti-egg antibodies to curb fertility. (The types of 
mice used in the study are normally resistant to mousepox infection.) 
However, when the researchers introduced another element- a gene for 
interleukin 4 (IL-4 )- into the mousepox vector to help boost antibody 
! 
production, they made a surprising discovery: instead of having the r-
desired effect, the modified mousepox virus suppressed the animals' cell-
mediated immunity and killed all the mice within nine days. The gene 
L 
alteration also made vaccines that normally protect mice against 
mousepox less effective" (Stephenson, 2001, p. 278). 
While mousepox itself is not harmful to humans, the technology that I rendered it lethal to mice could theoretically, be used on viruses that affect 
humans as well. This ability to engineer lethal pathogens from existing, less 
virulent strains, presents an alarming prospect. In spite of technological advances, 
man remains relatively ill equipped to respond efficiently to a mass outbreak of 
one of these pathogens in either its natural state or technologically altered 
(O'Toole, 2002). 
Finally, global interconnectedness has made the human species more 
vulnerable to disease. Transmission of any illness that can be spread from person 
to person will be spread farther and faster than ever before. During the influenza 
pandemic of 1918, it took approximately six weeks for the illness to circle the 
' 
globe. Thanks to today's international travel, a bioterrorism attack could circle L 
the globe in a matter of hours or days rather than weeks. Urbanization, intrusion 
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into remote areas, a global food supply, and antibiotic resistance also increase our 
vulnerability to a disease outbreak (O'Toole, 2002). 
Dark Winter- An Exercise in Bioterrorism 
In June of2001, The Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense 
Strategies partnered with several other non-military agencies to simulate a 
national security response to a bioterrorist attack. During a series of mock 
"National Security Council" meetings responding to a fictitious smallpox attack, 
council members debated and acted on a variety of policy options. Decisions 
made dictated succeeding scenarios (O'Toole & Inglesby, 2001). 
After the exercise was completed and analyzed by the Hopkins Center, the 
conclusions reached revealed significant deficiencies in the United States' ability 
to effectively manage a bioterrorist attack. Many major issues revolved around 
lack of information and lack of resources. 
1) Leaders are unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks, 
available policy options, and their consequences. Senior decision makers were 
not familiar with the events that would follow a bioterrorism attack. Critical 
decisions and their implications were dependant on public health strategies and 
possible mechanisms to care for large numbers of sick people- issues that the 
national security and defense officials were not experienced in analyzing. 
2) Following a bioterrorist attack, leaders' key decisions would depend on 
data and expertise from medical and public health sectors. During the exercise, 
after the smallpox attack was recognized, decision makers wanted information 
that was not readily available such as, access to information about the location of 
' 
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the original attacks, ability to predict the size of the epidemic based on initial 
cases, how many people were exposed, how many people had been hospitalized, 
and how to track those vaccinated. The lack of this information illustrated to 
leaders that there is not a system that can provide a rapid flow of medical and 
public health information needed in a public health emergency. 
L 
3) The lack of sufficient vaccine or drugs to prevent the spread of disease 
severely limits management decisions. The shortages of the smallpox vaccine 
adversely affected the ability to contain the epidemic. It contributed to panic as 
citizens rushed to get vaccinated and had an effect on decisions made by leaders. 
For example one participant questioned how the decision would be made to as to 
who would get the vaccine and who would not (O'Toole & Inglesby, 2001). 
4) The US. health care system lacks the surge capacity to deal with mass 
casualties. During the exercise, hospitals across the country were inundated with 
demands for care. The demand was highest in the areas where the outbreaks 
occurred. Some fictional "victims" traveled from areas where outbreaks occurred 
to other locations prior to becoming symptomatic. This action distributed victims 
across the country. In addition to the smallpox victims, people who worried that 
they had been exposed to smallpox requested treatment. Additionally there were 
those who had common illnesses but thought they had smallpox. 
5) To end a disease outbreak after a bioterrorist attack, decision makers 
will require ongoing medical advice from senior public health and medical 
leaders. The leaders in Dark Winter faced dwindling supplies of vaccines and an 
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expanding epidemic. Initiating quarantine was suggested but it was not clear if 
that would have helped interrupt the transmission of disease. 
6) The individual actions of U.S. citizens will be critical in ending the 
spread of contagious disease- leaders must gain the trust and sustained 
cooperation of the American People. Participants in the Dark Winter exercise 
expressed concern that it would be unlikely that vaccination and quarantine of 
large groups of people would be possible without their cooperation. Officials 
acknowledged the need to reassure the public that resources were being 
distributed fairly, that disease containment measures were for the good of society 
in general, and that the government remained in control (O'Toole & Inglesby, 
2001). 
Combating Bioterrorism 
Combating bioterrorism requires a stronger public health infrastructure 
(O'Toole, 2002). There is not an effective system to the United States Public 
Health System, but rather "fragmented pattern of activities" related to responding 
to infectious disease outbreaks (Henderson, 2001). 
State and local public health departments are also disjointed. Currently 
many state and local health departments do not have internet access and are not 
connected to other public health departments through a strong network. Public 
health officials will be called upon to lead a response to disease outbreaks as a 
result of a bioterrorist attack. This will prove difficult with the current system. It 
) 
f-
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will also be public health departments who will be expected to educate, inform, 
and reassure the public in the event of this type of disaster (Henderson, 2001). 
In an outbreak originating from multiple sites, such as the anthrax that 
appeared in both Florida and Washington D.C. following the September 11, 2001 
attack, information exchange among public health agencies, between public 
health and our country's decision markers, the private health care sector, and the 
public in general will be paramount. The lack of information technology and 
communication between departments could hinder recognizing and reporting of 
an illness outbreak, the ability to provide guidance to health care providers, and 
the access to educate, inform and reassure the public, all important public health 
functions. Strengthening the communication and cooperation between federal, 
state, and local health departments, and developing a system-wide plan for 
responding to such a disaster is vital to a satisfactory outcome should we fall 
victim to such an attack. (O'Toole, 2002). 
Another key issue in the face of a bioweapons attack is that most health 
care providers are unfamiliar with the presentation of illness and treatments for 
the pathogens that are likely to be used in such an attack (Waeckerle, 2000; 
Vastag, 2001; Rehnan & Olson, 2002). Clinicians must be trained to recognize 
the symptoms of illness related to the most common bioterrorism pathogens 
(Danzig & Berkowsky 1997; Simon 1997). They should also be included in 
community preparedness programs (Waeckerle, 2000). Finally, because 
clinicians will be in the front line for remediation in the wake of a bioweapons 
attack, they should be alert to the occurrence of specific syndromes that might 
l 
L 
L 
' L 
E 
1 
r 
L 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 17 
herald an outbreak (CDC, 200lc; Lederberger, 1997; Waeckerle, 2000; Gwerder ~-
& Beaton, 2001 ). The occurrence of such specific syndromes can be the frrst 
indication of a bioterrorist attack (Shenold, 2001). 
Urgency in reporting findings to the appropriate public health agency is 
essential. Often diagnostic tests able to confirm these unusual pathogens can take 
time, delaying reporting and treatment. For example, in October of2001, a postal 
worker at the Brentwood facility in Washington D.C., was working near a woman 
L 
L who handled a letter that contained a white powder in it. On October 16, three 
days after the exposure, the worker began to have symptoms consistent with 
inhalation anthrax. October 181h, the worker had a culture for anthrax done at his 
private physician's office. By October 21, he was seriously ill, but did not yet I have the results of his culture tests. Desperate, he called 911 and told the 
dispatcher that he thought he had anthrax, because his symptoms seemed to be 
consistent with what he had read. He died of inhalation anthrax later that day 
(O'Connor, 2001). 
Bioterrorism Agent Categories 
The actions of the bacterial agents are described in USAMRIID's medical 
management of biological casualties handbook: 
Bacteria generally cause disease in human beings and animals by one of two 
mechanisms: by invading host tissues, and by producing poisons (toxins). 
Many pathogenic bacteria utilize both mechanisms. The diseases they 
produce often respond to specific therapy with antibiotics (Kortepeter et al., ~-
2001, p. 13). 
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Viral pathogens, on the other hand do not respond to treatment with antibiotics. 
Treatments range from supportive measures to antiviral medications. 
The CDC (2001a) categorizes potential bioweapons according to the 
following criteria: 1) public health impact based on illness and death; 2) delivery 
potential to large populations based on stability of the agent, ability to mass 
produce and distribute a virulent agent, and potential for person-to-person 
transmission of the agent; 3) public perception as related to public fear and 
potential civil disruption; and 4) special public health preparedness needs based 
on stockpile requirements, enhanced surveillance, or diagnostic needs. 
Biological warfare agents and potential biological threat agents were reviewed by 
the CDC and selected based on the greatest threat to civilian populations. Table 
2.2 lists the highest-priority agents in Category A, followed by second and third 
highest priority agents in categories Band C, respectively (CDC 2001a). 
Specific Bioterrorism Agents 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline all known potential 
bioterrorism agents; therefore this paper will address the key characteristics of the 
CDC category A agents including pathophysiology, epidemiology, dispersal and 
transmission, incubation period, symptoms, diagnostic methods, treatment and 
isolation precautions, and prevention. Table 2.3 lists a brief summary of the 
category A pathogens; however, the reader is directed to the USAMRIID'S 
Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, 4'h edition for more 
complete information on clinical features, diagnostics, and medical management 
of the category A pathogens as well as the category Band C agents. 
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Table 2.2 
Biological Agent Categories 
Category A 
Agent Bacillis anthracis 
Clostridium botulinum 
Yersinia pestis 
Variola major 
Francisella tularensis 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers: 
Arenaviridae 
Filoviridae 
Priority Highest 
Dissemination Easily disseminated or transmitted from 
person to person 
Mortality High Mortality 
Public Health Might cause public panic and social 
Considerations disruption. Requires special action for 
public health preparedness. 
Category B 
Brucella species 
Epsion toxin 
Clostridium perfingens 
Food safety threats 
Burkholderia mallei 
Burkholderia psuedomal/ei 
Chlamydia psittaci 
Coxiella burnetii 
Ricinus communis 
Staphylococcal EnterotoxinB 
Rickettsia prowazekii 
Viral encephalitis 
Water safety threats 
Second Highest 
Moderately easy to disseminate 
Low Mortality Moderate Morbidity 
Requires specific enhancements of CDC's 
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease 
surveillance 
Category C 
Emerging infectious 
Disease threats such as 
Niaph virus and Hantavirus 
Third Highest 
Ease of production and dissemination 
Potential for high morbidity and mortality 
rates and major health impact 
Could be engineered for mass dissemination 
in the future due to availability. 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents 
Causative 
organism 
Bacillis 
anthracis 
Illness 
Inhalational 
Anthrax 
Cutaneous 
Anthrax 
Incubation Symptoms 
Period 
1-6 days Flu-like symptoms (fever, 
fatigue, muscle- aches, 
dyspnea, nonproductive 
cough, headache) chest 
pain., possible 1-2 day 
improvement then rapid 
respiratory failure and 
shock. Meningitis may 
develop. 
1-12 days Intense itching followed 
by painless popular lesion 
s, then vesicular lesions, 
developing into eschar 
surrounded by edema 
Diagnostic 
Tests 
Gram stain 
Ag-ELISA 
Serology 
ELISA 
Peripheral 
blood smear 
Treatment Isolation 
Precautions 
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg IV q 8-12 h OR Contact 
Doxycline 200mg 1 V, then 100 mg IV q isolation for 
8-12 h OR cutaneous 
Penicillin 2 million units 1 V q 2 h PLUS anthrax 
Streptomycin30 mg/kg IM qd (or 
Garamycin) 
Prevention 
Vaccine~ Michigan Biological Products 
Institute vaccine (licensed): 0.5m1SC at 
0, 2, 4 wk and 6, 12, 18 mo, and annual 
booster. 
Exposure: Ciprofloxacin 500 mg PO bid 
x 4 wk (if unvaccinated begin vaccine 
regimen) OR Doxycycline 100 mg PO 
bid x 4 wk plus vaccination 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative 
organism 
Clostridium 
botulinum 
toxins 
Illness 
Botulism 
Incubation 
Period 
1-5 days 
Symptoms Diagnostic 
Tests 
Afebrile, excess mucous in Ag-ELISA 
throat, dysphagia, dry Mouse neutral 
mouth and throat, 
dizziness, then difficulty 
moving eyes, mild 
papillary dilation and 
nystagmus, intermittent 
ptosis, indistinct speech, 
unsteady gait, extreme 
symmetric descending 
weakness, flaccid paralysis, 
generally normal mental 
status. 
Treatment 
DOD- heptavalent antitoxin for 
(serotypes A-G) (IND): equine 
despeciated I vial (10 ml) IV 
CDC- Trivalent equine antitoxin for 
Serotypes A,B,E (licensed) 
Isolation 
Precautions 
Standard 
Precautions 
Prevention 
DOD pentavalent toxoid for serotypes A-
E (IND: SC at 0, 2, 12 wk, then yearly 
boosters 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative 
organism 
Francisella 
tularensis 
Illness 
Tularemia 
Incubation 
Period 
2~10 days 
Symptoms 
Fever, headache, chills, rigors, 
body aches, sore throat. dry or 
slightly productive cough and 
chest pain or tightness, 
purulent sputum, dyspnea, 
tachypnea, pleuritic pain, 
hemoptysis nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhea, malaise, anorexia, 
and weight Joss 
Diagnostic 
Tests 
Culture-Serology: 
agglutination 
Treatment 
Streptomycin 30 mglkg IM qd x 
10-14 d OR 
Gentamicin 3-5 mg!kgld x 
10-14/d 
Isolation 
Precautions 
Standard 
precautions 
Prevention 
Live attenuated vaccine (IND) 
Scarification. 
Exposure: Doxycline 100 mg PO 
q12hxl4d OR tetracycline2 g/d POx 
14 d 
(Table Continues) 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative 
or~anism 
Variola major 
Illness 
Small Pox 
Incubation 
Period 
7wl7 days 
Symptoms Diagnostic 
Tests 
Prodromal period: malaise, ELISA, PCR< 
fever, rigors, vomiting, virus isolation 
headache, and backache ... 
After 2 -4 days, skin lesions 
appear and progress uniformly 
from macules to papules to 
vesicles and pustules mostly on 
fuce, neck, palms, soles, and 
subsequently progress to trunk. 
Treatment 
Cidofovir (effective in vitro) 
Isolation 
Precautions 
Airborne 
precautions 
Prevention 
Wyeth calf lymph vaccinia vaccine 
(licensed) 
DOD cell culture derived vaccinia 
vaccine (IND) scarification 
Exposure: 
Vaccinia immune globulin 0.6 mllkg IM 
(within 3 d of exposure: best within 24 
hr) 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative Illness Incubation Symptoms Diagnostic Treatment Isolation 
orsanism Period Tests Precautions 
Yersinia Pneumonic 2~3 days High fever, cough, hemoptysis, Gram or WriteR Streptomycin 30 mglkg IM qd in Pneumonic: 
Pestis 
Plague chest pain, nausea, vomiting, Giemsa Stain, Ag- 2 divided doses x 10 day (or Droplet 
headache. Advanced disease: ELISA, Garamycin) OR precaution 
purpuric skin lesions, copious Culture, Serology: Doxycycline 200 mg IV then until patient 
watery or purulent sputum ELISA, IFA 100 mg IV q 12 h x 10-14 days treated for 3 
production, respiratory failure OR days 
in 1 - 6 days. Chloramphenicoll g IV q 6 h x 
Bubonic 2-7 days Eschar at bite mark, painful 10-14 d 
Plague bubo, fever, headache, 
prostration, abdominal distress, 
enlarged lymphnodes, rigors, 
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea 
Septicemic (may be bloody) cutaneous 
Plague petechiae, DIC 
Prevention 
Greer inactivated vaccine (licensed): 
1.0 ml then0.2 ml boost at 1-3 and 3-6 
mos. 
Exposure: 
Tetracycline 500 mg PO qid x 7 d OR 
Doxycycline 100 mgPO q12hx7d 
Vector (Rodent) control 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative Illness Incubation Symptoms 
Organism Period 
Arenaviridae Argentine 6~17days fever, headache, myalgia 
(AHF) conjunctival suffusion 
Bolivian abdominal pain, axillary 
(BHF) petechiae, mucosal bleeding 
Venezuelan thrombocytopenia, platelet 
(VHF) dysfunction, protienuria, 
Hemorrhagic shock, encephalopathy, 
Fevers tremor, alterations in consciousness, 
seizures 
Diagnostic 
Tests 
SerumlgM 
Increase in IgG antibody titers 
Collected serially or 
identification of viral antigen in 
blood or tissue 
Treatment Isolation Prevention 
Precautions 
Ribavirin for Lassa Contact No vaccine 
fever or HFRS; precautions 
Convalescent -phase 
plasma for AHF 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative Illness Incubation Symptoms 
Organism Period 
Bunyaviridae Hantavirus 1-3 weeks hypoalbuminimia, thrombocytopenia 
(HPS) arterial oxygen desaturation, pulmonary edema 
Congo- CCHF- hepatitis, profuse bleeding, fever, 
Crimean headache, myalgia, diffuse capillary leak 
Hemorrhagic syndrome, bradycardia, petechiae/purpura- skin and 
Fever (CCHF) mucous membranes 
Rift Valley RVF- in most cases a self limiting febrile illness-
Fever occasionally patients develop hemorrhagic fever 
(RVF) with shock and bleeding 
, "" .. ,,,,,, T , ""+-"r'~-"'"', "'"'"h·'""~'Tl'!'''l" H-· ~ ···--"~"-•" 
Diagnostic Treatment Isolation Precautions Prevention 
Tests 
Serum IgM and IgG virus Supportive Contact precautions No vaccine 
specific antibodies present in with special attention 
early convalescence. to needle sticks and 
HPS IgM and IgG antibodies are other hazards posed by 
detectible within 48 hours of laboratory specimens. 
illness onset 
(table continues) 
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Table 2.3 
Summary of Category A Agents (continued) 
Causative 
Organism 
Filoviridae 
Flaviviridae 
Illness 
Ebola Virus 
Marburg Virus 
Dengue Fever 
Yellow Fever 
Incubation 
Period 
4~6days 
3-9days 
3-14days 
3-6days 
1'"'--'""'"''' ,,,-1'''" 
Symptoms Diagnostic Treatment 
Tests 
Headache, malaise, myalgia, high fever, diarrhea, Patients should be isolated until ConvalescentM 
abdominal pain, dehydration, lethargy, pleuritic chest virologic studies indicate they Phase serum 
pain, dry cough, pharyngitis, maculopapular rash, are free of virus, usually 21 days may be 
hemataemesis, metana, bleeding from the nose, gums from onset of illness. helpful. 
and vagina 
As above,+ produces lesions in almost all organs. 
Fever, cough, pharyngitis, headache, anorexia, Serologic testing or viral testing. Supportive 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, circumoral Both viruses can be isolated therapy, 
cyanosis, petechiae on the forehead and extremities, from blood obtained in the acute possibly 
cyanotic extremities, hypotension. phase of the illness. Interferon. 
-·~Y1'·1'"' w-•·~•'•" "I"!T'Y'''""'"'' '11:'111UIIIIIIII11tfM'"~""''" .. , • ., .• ,,.".~'1'"11'1'1'"" ' ''-''T"T' ' 
Isolation 
Precautions 
Strict Isolation 
with particular 
attention to 
specimen 
handling. 
Standard 
precautions 
"I"''' 
Prevention 
No vaccine or 
post exposure 
prophylaxis 
Live attenuated 
virus for yellow 
fever available at 
state approved 
vaccination 
centers. 
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BACILLIS ANTHRACIS (ANTHRAX) 
Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the bacteria Bacillus anthracis. It 
occurs primarily in domestic herbivores such as cattle, sheep, goats, swine, and 
horses. It can be passed from animals to humans through the handling or 
processing of contaminated wool, hides, and other animal products. B. anthracis 
produces hardy spores, which may persist in a viable state in the environment for L 
years. Anthrax infections present in three forrns: inhalation, cutaneous, and 
gastrointestinal (CDC, 2001a; Franz, et al., 1997). According to Shenold (2001), L 
inhalation anthrax will account for the majority of mortality and morbidity 
following an intentional release of anthrax. Untreated inhalational anthrax can 
spontaneously in approximately 80% to 90% of cases. The remaining 10% to I lead to septicemia and death. Untreated cutaneous anthrax resolves 
20% of untreated cutaneous anthrax cases lead to progressive infection and death 
(Fauci et al., 1994). Case-fatality rates for inhalational anthrax are thought to 
! 
r-approach 90% to 100%. Early treatment of cutaneous anthrax is usually curative 
(CDC, 2001f). r 
Pathophysiology 
B. anthracis is deposited into the alveoli after the inhalation of anthrax 
spores. Some spores are destroyed by macrophages. Other spores are transported 
to the mediastinal lymph nodes by the lymphatic system. After a dormancy 
period of2 to 43 days, germination occurs followed by the onset of clinical L 
symptoms. B. anthracis bacilli release toxins that cause tissue hemorrhage, 
edema, and necrosis. In cutaneous anthrax, toxins cause local necrosis and 
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edema, and if severe enough can progress until bacteremia develops (Ingles by et 
al., 2002). 
Epidemiology L 
Naturally occurring inhalational anthrax is rare. Eighteen cases were 
reported between 1900 and 1976; none have since been reported. Most of the 
reported cases originated in those working with animal hides or wool with two 
cases in laboratory workers. Cutaneous anthrax is more common. Approximately 
2, 000 cases are reported yearly worldwide. Generally cutaneous anthrax is 
attributable to contact with infected animals. In the U.S. 224 cases of cutaneous 
anthrax were reported between 1944 and 1994. Inhalational anthrax is expected 
to account for most of the illness and death following a bioterrorist attack with B. 
anthracis. A single case is significant since it rarely occurs naturally (Inglesby et 
al., 2002). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
Anthrax can be released as an aerosol, that is, the agent dispersed as a 
respirable aerosol with particles approximately 1 - 10 !.Ill in diameter. Dispersing 
a respirable aerosol requires a high energy generating system to produce the small 
particle size, appropriate weather conditions to assure the aerosol cloud stays near 
the ground, and adequate infectivity or toxicity of the agent to produce illness or 
death (Zajtchuk, 1997). The infective dose has been reported as low as 1 - 3 
spores and as high as 8,000 to 50,000 spores (Inglesby et al., 2002; Franz et al., 
1997). It is also effective as a powder as evidenced by the anthrax cases of 2001. 
A total of two grams of powder was used, which is reported to have contained 
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between 100 billion to 1 trillion spores per gram (Ingles by eta!., 2002). The 
outcome was 10 cases of inhalation anthrax and five resultant deaths. Anthrax is 
not transmitted from person to person. Exposure can occur through contact with 
contaminated food, water, or through cutaneous contact as well as through 
inhalation (Franz eta!., 1997; Kortepeter eta!., 2001). 
Incubation 
The incubation period for anthrax varies from one day to approximately 
six days (Franz eta!., 1997; Kortepeter et al., 2001). According to the CDC, 
symptoms could begin as long as 60 days post-exposure (CDC, 2001b) 
Symptoms 
The first stage of inhalation anthrax resembles the flu. Initial symptoms 
include sore throat, mild fever, muscle aches, and malaise. A non-productive 
cough, and nonspecific chest discomfort follows. Symptoms may improve for 
two to three days before progressing to the second stage characterized by severe 
respiratory distress with an abrupt onset, dyspnea, stridor, and diaphoresis (Franz 
eta!, 1997). Shock with meningitis frequently develops (CDC, 200la). In the 
second stage cyanosis and hypotension progress rapidly and death can occur 
within hours (Ingles by et a!., 2002). 
Diagnosis l-
The most useful test is a standard blood culture, which shows growth in 6 
to 24 hours; however, blood cultures must be drawn prior to the initiation of 
antibiotics. The laboratory should be alerted to the possibility of anthrax, as 
biochemical testing and review of colonial morphology could provide a 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 31 
preliminary diagnosis in as little as 12 to 24 hours. Sputum and gram stain are 
unlikely to be diagnostic of inhalational anthrax. In cutaneous anthrax, gram stain 
can be performed on the vesicular fluid in addition to performing blood cultures. 
Nasal swab testing for inhalational anthrax has an unknown predictive value 
(Inglesby et al., 2002). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
The treatment of choice for inhalation anthrax is Ciprofloxin- a quinalone 
L 
antibiotic given intravenously. However, following the anthrax attacks of2001, 
the CDC recommended the use of two or three antibiotics in combination in 
persons with confirmed inhalational anthrax. Pleural effusions were present in all 
of the first 10 patients with inhalational anthrax in 2001. Seven required drainage 
' 
of their pleural effusions, and three required chest tubes. Future patients with 
inhalational anthrax should be expected to have pleural effusions that will likely 
require drainage (Inglesby et a!., 2002). Hospitalization for treatment and 
supportive therapy for airway management, shock, and fluid volume deficit are 
essential as well (Franz et al., 1997). 
Prevention 
Pre-exposure vaccination is available but recommendations for its use 
have been limited to the military and other [unnamed] high-risk groups. 
Recommended post-exposure prophylaxis consists of treatment with ciprofloxacin 
or other fluoroquinolone initiated in adults with presumed inhalational anthrax 
infection. Antibiotic resistance to penicillin- and tetracycline-class drugs should 
+--
be assumed following a terrorist attack until laboratory testing demonstrate 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 32 
susceptibility Once the antibiotic susceptibility of the B. anthracis strain has 
been confirmed, the most widely available, effective, and least toxic antibiotic is 
recommended for persons requiring post-exposure prophylaxis (Ingles by et a!., 
2002). 
CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM (BOTULISM) 
Botulism is caused by the botulinum toxins, a group of seven related 
neurotoxins produced by the spore-forming bacillus, Clostridium botulinum and 
two other Clostridia species (Franz eta!, 2001). Like B. anthracis, this bacterium 
is found in the soil and forms spores. They grow best in environments with low 
oxygen content. Approximately II 0 cases of botulism are reported in the United 
States every year. Most often these cases are foodbome or infant botulism (CDC, 
200la.) Infant botulism is the most common form of botulism and occurs when 
C. botulinum colonizes the relatively germ free intestines of infants. A common 
source of C. botulinum in infants is contaminated honey. According to Franz et 
a!., (1997) C. botulinum could be delivered by aerosol or via water supplies. In 
either case the clinical presentation would resemble that of a foodbome infection. 
Pathophysiology 
Botulinum toxin attaches to the synaptic vesicles of cholinergic nerves and 
blocks the release of acetylcholine. This results in a descending paralysis from the 
cranial nerves to the extremities. Paralysis of the respiratory muscles also occurs. 
Once the toxin has entered the synapses, the antitoxin can no longer inactivate it 
and only intensive, supportive care is useful. Approximately 85% of the victims 
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who receive such care recover. Most of the cases that result in death are caused 
by respiratory infections (Cotran, Kumar & Robbins, 1989). 
Epidemiology 
Recognizing a botulism outbreak requires heightened clinical suspicion. 
Aerosol dissemination may be readily identifiable because the majority of cases 
will occur in the same location and time period but will not have a common 
dietary exposure. Botulism and botulinum toxin are not contagious and cannot be 
transmitted from person to person. However, bacteria intentionally modified to 
produce botulinum toxin might be contagious. 
If food were deliberately used as a vehicle for the toxin, the outbreak 
would need to be distinguished from naturally occurring foodbome botulism. 
During the past 20 years, the epidemiology offoodbome botulism has expanded 
beyond its traditional association with home-preserved foods and now includes 
non-preserved foods and public eating places- features that could make terrorist 
use ofbotulinum toxin more difficult to detect (CDC, 200lf). The case fatality 
rate for foodbome botulism is approximately 7.5% and is low for infant botulism 
as well (Fauci et a!., 1998). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
The most likely scenario for the dispersal of botulinum toxin in a 
bioterrorism incident is aerosol dispersal. While it is not as likely, botulinum 
toxin could be used to contaminate food supplies (Franz eta!, 1997). Botulism is 
not transmitted from person to person (Franz et a!., 1997). 
Incubation 
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The incubation period for botulism is from one to five days. However, the 
onset of symptoms is dose-dependant; therefore, a large dose results in rapid onset 
of severe symptoms. 
Symptoms 
Following ingestion, the onset of symptoms begins with cranial nerve 
palsies, followed by symmetrical descending flaccid paralysis, with generalized 
weakness and progression to respiratory failure. Because the symptoms are dose 
dependant, it may be up to five days after exposure before the onset of symptoms 
when the exposure is to low doses of toxin (Kortepeter eta!., 2001). 
Diagnosis 
The most direct way to confirm the diagnosis of botulism is to 
demonstrate the botulinum toxin in the patient's serum or stool by injecting serum 
or stool into mice and looking for signs of botulism in the mice. The bacteria can 
also be isolated from the stool of persons with food borne and infant botulism. 
These tests can be performed at some state health department laboratories and at 
CDC (CDC, 2001:1). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
Botulism is treated with an antitoxin. Early administration of the antitoxin 
is crucial. The antitoxin is only effective against circulating toxins in patients 
with symptoms that are progressing. Once the toxin enters the synapses the 
antitoxin cannot inactivate it. Also once symptoms stop progressing, the antitoxin 
is no longer effective. 
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Three different antitoxin preparations are available from the CDC via state 
and local health departments. A trivalent antitoxin contains antibodies against 
botulinum toxin types A, B, and E, the most common causes of human botulism. 
If another toxin type were intentionally disseminated, patients could potentially be 
treated with an investigational heptavalent (ABCDEFG) antitoxin held by the 
U.S. Army. A human anti-serum for infant botulism is still being evaluated for 
effectiveness (Kortepeter eta!., 2001). Anti-serum is administered by both intra-
vascular and intra-muscular routes (Fauci eta!., 1998). 
Patients should be hospitalized and monitored closely (Fauci et a!., 
1998). In addition to antitoxin, treatment including ventillatory support is 
indicated. In the event of foodborne botulism, removal of contaminated stomach 
contents is performed by lavage (CDC 2001c) 
Prevention 
Research indicates that botulinum antitoxin is very effective for aerosol 
exposure if given before the onset of symptoms, as the toxin has not begun to 
interfere with the release of acetylcholine (Kortepeter, eta!, 2001 ). Prophylactic 
equine anti-toxin for asymptomatic persons who have ingested a food known to 
contain botulinum toxin is not recommended due to the risk of hypersensitivity 
reactions (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS (TULAREMIA) 
Tularemia is caused by Francisella tularensis. It is a highly infectious 
bacterium, causing flu-like illness with progression to pneumonia and death with 
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exposure to as few as 10 organisms (Dennis et al, 2001). It is resistant to cold but 
can be killed by heat or chemical disinfectants. 
Pathophysiology 
F tularensis enters through the skin, mucous membranes, gastrointestinal 
tract, or lungs. It spreads to the lymph nodes and multiplies, and then spreads to 
organs throughout the body, predominantly affecting the skin, liver, spleen, and 
lymph nodes. Bacteremia is common in the early stages of infection. Initially 
there is a local reaction at the site of infection that becomes suppurative and 
necrotic. Inhalational exposures develop hemorrhagic inflannnation of the I 
~ airways that can progress to pneumonia. Alveolar spaces fill with an exudate of mononuclear cells. Pleuritis with adhesions and effusion and hilar lymphadenopathy are common radiological and pathological fmdings (Dennis et 
al., 2001). 
Epidemiology 
Tularemia has been reported from every state except Hawaii; however, 
most cases occur in south-central and western states (especially Missouri, 
Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Montana). Approximately 140 to 310 
infections are reported in the U.S. each year, mostly from persons handling 
rabbits or rabbit skins (Cotran, Kumar, &Robbins 1987). Ticks and tabanid flies 
serve as vectors. Animal reservoirs include wild rabbits, squirrels, birds, sheep, 
beavers, muskrats, and domestic dogs and cats. F tularensis is a hardy organism 
that can persist for months in mud, water, and decaying animal carcass. Ticks 
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pass the organism to their offspring via a transovarian route. Tularemia has a 
fatality rate of5% if untreated (Fauci eta!., 1998). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
The working group on Civilian Biodefense believes that of the various 
possible ways that F tularensis could be used as a weapon, an aerosol release 
would cause the greatest adverse medical and public health consequences (Dennis 
et a!., 2001 ). The organism is present in tick feces and it is transmitted as a tick 
takes a blood meal in an area contaminated with its feces (Fauci et a!., 1998). It 
can also be contracted through ingestion of contaminated food or water or through 
inhalation. Human-to-human transmission has not been documented (Dennis et 
a!., 2001). 
Incubation 
The incubation period for tularemia ranges from 2 to 10 days. 
Symptoms 
The onset of tularemia is abrupt, with fever, headache, chills and rigors, 
myalgias, coryza, and sore throat. A dry or slightly productive cough and 
substernal pain or tightness may occur. Nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea 
sometimes occur. Progressive weakness, malaise, anorexia, and weight loss 
develop with continued illness. If untreated, symptoms can persist for weeks or 
months causing with progressive disability. Tularemia can also cause pneumonia, 
sepsis, and, meningitis (Dennis et a!., 2001 ). 
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Diagnosis 
Diagnosis of typhoidal tularemia is difficult as the symptoms are non-
specific. The diagnosis can be confirmed by serological testing. In the standard 
tube agglutination test, a single titer of2: 1:160 is interpreted as a presumptive 
positive result. A fourfold increase in titer between paired serum samples 
collected two to three weeks apart is considered diagnostic (Fauci et al., 1998). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
Streptomycin given intramuscularly or gentamycin given intravenously or 
intramuscularly are the antibiotics for treatment. Isolation precautions other than 
universal or standard precautions are unnecessary because tularemia is not spread 
from person to person. A live attenuated vaccine is currently under review by the 
Food and Drug Administration. (Franz et al., 1997). The CDC does not list the 
vaccine's efficacy. 
Prevention 
Prevention is based on avoidance of exposure to known vectors. A 
vaccine made from live attenuated F. tularensis is available from the CDC and is 
recommend for those at high risk such as game wardens, veterinarians, hunters or 
people who work with large quantities of cultured organisms. Other 
considerations include avoidance of the skinning of wild animals, use of gloves 
for handling animal carcasses, and the use of insect repellant while in endemic 
areas (Fauci et al., 1998). Post-exposure prophylaxis regimens with oral 
tetracycline in doses of one gram daily for 28 days or two grams daily for 14 days 
both provided protection from infection in a research study, when the medication 
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was begun withln 24 hours of exposure to aerosolized F. tularensis (Dennis et al., 
2001). 
VARIOLA VIRUS (SMALLPOX) 
Smallpox is caused by the Orthopox virus, Variola. There has not been a 
naturally occurring case of smallpox reported since 1977 (Franz et al, 1997). In 
1980, one year after the World Health Organization officially announced the 
global eradication of smallpox, the World Health Assembly recommended that all 
countries cease vaccination (Fauci et al., 1994; Henderson et al, 1999). The level 
of immunity among persons who were vaccinated is questionable; therefore, no 
one is considered immune (CDC, 2001a). 
Pathophysiology 
After aerosol exposure, variola travels from the respiratory tract to the 
lymph nodes where it replicates and causes viral illness followed by a rash. 
Before onset of pox lesions, variola virus can be detected in the blood. (Franz et 
al., 1997) 
Epidemiology 
Smallpox was once endemic worldwide. Before vaccination was 
practiced, ahnost everyone contracted the disease. The last naturally occurring 
case of smallpox was reported in 1977 in Somolia. Before the eradication of 
smallpox, there were two principal forms ofthe disease. Variola major had a 
mortality rate of20 to 50% and a much milder form, variola minor (or alastrim), 
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had a mortality rate of less than 1%. Smallpox was a relatively non-contagious 
disease whose transmission required close contact (Fauci eta!., 1998). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
Smallpox is extremely infectious by aerosol route. As few as I 0 to 100 
organisms is sufficient to cause infection. It is transmitted via aerosol. The 
mucous membrane lesions shed infectious respiratory secretions during the frrst 
few days of illness. These secretions are the most important but not the only 
means of viral transmission. Variola titers in the throat, conjunctiva, and urine 
diminish with time, but the virus can be detected in the scabs during the recovery 
phase of the illness. Therefore, patients should be isolated and considered 
infectious until all scabs separate. (Franz 1997). 
Incubation 
The incubation period is 7 - 17 days. The average incubation period is 12 
days. Progression to vesicular and pustular lesions takes place over one to two 
weeks. 
Symptoms 
Symptoms include fever, malaise, vomiting, rigors, headache, and 
backache. Delirium and an erythematous rash are reported by a small percentage 
of patients. Two to three days later, enanthem appears with a discrete rash on the 
face, hands, forearms, and oropharyngeal mucosa. Lesions progress from macule 
to papules to vesicles then to pustular vesicles. Eight to fourteen days after the 
onset of illness scabs form with subsequent scarring (Franz et al.,1997; Reiman & 
Olson 2002). 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 41 
Diagnosis 
Smallpox infection can be confrrmed in the laboratory by electron 
microscopic examination of vesicular or pustular fluid or scabs. Definitive 
laboratory identification and characterization of the virus involves growth of the 
virus in cell culture or on chorioallantoic egg membrane and characterization of 
strains by use of biologic assays. (Henderson eta!., 1999). 
Treatment and Isolation Precantions 
There is no proven treatment for smallpox but research to evaluate new 
antiviral agents is ongoing. 
Prevention 
Although immunization is still available, there is not sufficient quantity of 
vaccine to inoculate the entire population of the U.S. and so smallpox remains a 
bioterrorism threat. Persons with suspected smallpox and their close contacts 
must be placed in strict quarantine with respiratory isolation for 17 days. Current 
treatment efforts are focused on the evaluation of possible antiviral agents such as 
cidofovir and its derivatives in the treatment of variola infections (Rehnan & 
Olson 2002). 
YERSINIA PESTIS (PLAGUE) 
Yersinia pestis is the bacterium that causes plague, a zoonotic disease of 
rodents. The disease is transmitted to humans by fleas that live on infected 
rodents. Symptoms of plague can also develop in domestic pets. Cats who are 
bitten by infected fleas frequently develop plague and subsequently die; however 
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dogs often recover. Dogs and cats can transport infected fleas from rodent 
infested areas to the home environment (Fauci et a!., 1998). The bacterium is 
found worldwide. Plague occurs in humans in three forms: bubonic, septicemic, 
and pneumonic. In bubonic plague, the site of entry is usually on the leg, a 
common site for fleabites. It may be marked by a small pustule or ulceration. 
Regional lymph nodes may enlarge, becoming suppurative, and forming a bubo 
(Cotran, Kumar, & Robbins, 1989). Septicemic plague is an overwhelming 
bacterial infection. The infection induces disseminated intrarvascular coagulation 
(Fauci, et al., 1998). The pnenmonic form of plague would be the most common 
form of the illness following an intentional release of the pathogen (Franz et al., 
1997). It is characterized by a severe confluent, hemorrhagic, and necrotizing 
bronchopnenmonia, often accompanied by fibrous pleuritis (Cotran, Kumar, & 
Robbins, 1989). Y Pestis is destroyed by sunlight and drying, but can live in the 
air for up to an hour, and in water, moist soil, and grain for several weeks (CDC 
2001a; Franz eta!., 1997). 
Pathophysiology 
In septicemic plague, the kidneys contain fibrin thrombi. Cardiac 
dilatation may develop and multifocal necrosis ofthe liver is common as is 
hemorrhagic splenic necrosis. Disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) 
develops followed by vascular necrosis. Aerosolization would result in an 
outbreak of pneumonic plague which is spread by inhalation of aerosolized 
bacilli. Airborne transmission can occur via the cough of a person infected with 
pneumonic plague. 
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Epidemiology 
There have been significant outbreaks of plague throughout history. In the 
year 542, a plague pandemic began in Egypt and, within 4 years, had spread 
around the world. Deaths attributable to plague during those years were 50 to 60 
percent. The second plague pandemic began in 1347 and within 5 years had 
killed more than 40 million people in Europe and China combined. 
Plague is still endemic to remote areas in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and 
southeastern Europe. From 1979 to 1993, 16,320 human plague cases were 
reported by 20 countries to the World Health Organization. The mortality rate for 
this time period was 10% (1,668 deaths). During the same time period, there 
were 227 plague cases with 32 deaths in the United States (14% mortality). From 
1950 to 1994, 373 plague cases were reported in the United States. Of these 
cases, 86% were bubonic plague, 12% were septicemic plague, and 2% were 
primary pneumonic plague (Fauci, et al., 1998). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
Naturally occurring plague outbreaks are caused by fleas from infected 
rodents. The Japanese experimented with releasing plague-infested fleas from 
airplanes as a means of dispersal, which would result in bubonic plague 
(Christopher 1997). However, Y pestis organisms can effectively be dispersed by 
aerosolization (Johns Hopkins Center for Biodefense Strategies, 2002). The 
infective dose is 100 to 500 organisms (Franz eta!., 1997). Septicemic plague 
occurs after the direct contact of infected fluid or tissue or from an infected 
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fleabite in the absence of a bubo. Person to person transmission results from 
exposure to infective respiratory droplets from a person or cat with respiratory 
plague or from accidental inhalation of Y. pestis in the laboratory (Fauci et al., 
1998). Advances in living conditions, public health, and antibiotic therapy make 
natural pandemics improbable, but plague outbreaks following an attack with a 
biological weapon do pose a serious threat. 
Incubation 
According to the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies 
(2000), a group of cases of pneumonic plague would appear one to two days after 
the aerosolization exposure. There would be many deaths following the onset of 
symptoms. The incubation period based on animal studies and human experience 
is one to six days. 
Symptoms 
In pneumonic plague, the clinical presentation would include pneumonia, 
fatigue, malaise, high fever, chills, headache, myalgia, cough with production of 
bloody sputum and clinical sepsis (Franz et al., 1997). 
Diagnosis 
Plague should always be considered when a normally healthy person 
presents with septic shock especially in areas where plague is endemic. 
Laboratory confmnation of plague depends on the isolation of Y. pestis from 
cultures of body fluids or tissues. Three blood culture specimens taken over a 45-
minute period will usually result in isolation of the bacterium (Fauci et al., 1998). 
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Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
Pneumonic plague is usually fatal iftreatment is not initiated within 24 
hours of the onset of symptoms. Streptomycin, gentamycin, chloramphenicol, 
and doxycycline have been found to be effective against Y. pestis. Supportive 
therapy includes intravenous fluids, hemodynamic monitoring, and ventillatory 
support. Droplet precautions should be initiated for any patient with pneumonic 
plague. A vaccine is available for use against bubonic plague; however, it has not 
been proven effective against pneumonic plague (Franz eta!., 1997). 
Prevention 
Post-exposure prophylactic treatment with tetracycline, doxycycline, or 
thrimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole can help prevent development of illness in the 
event of contact with a person who is known to have plague. Avoidance of sick 
or dead animals, as well as and avoidance of areas where plague is known to be 
endemic can help prevent the spread of the disease, as can use of protective 
clothing and insect repellant when in plague infested areas (Fauci eta!., 1998). 
HEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUSES (HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS) 
Hemorrhagic Fever is a category that describes the disease processes 
resulting from infection by anyone of a number of RNA viruses. Each virus is 
capable of causing a hemorrhagic fever syndrome. Clinical and epidemiological 
data related to these viruses are limited; outbreaks are sporadic and unanticipated, 
and there are few case series or clinical trials involving human subjects (Borio et 
a!., 2002). The viruses are from different viral families. They include 
Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Filoviridae, and the Flaviviridae (CDC, 2002). 
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Although no evidence for weaponization exists for these viruses, they are 
considered a prospective bioterrorism threat because of their potential for aero so I 
dissemination or weaponization, or likelihood for confusion with similar agents 
that might be weaponized (Kortepeter et al., 2001). 
ARENAVIRIDAE 
Arenaviridae is family of zoonotic viruses. The natural reservoirs are 
rodents with each virus associated with a particular type of rodent. The rodent 
hosts carry the infection but do not develop signs of illness themselves. Various 
rodent species that carry Arenaviridae are found all over the world. 
The Arenaviridae viruses cause Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever, Bolivian 
Hemorrhagic Fever, Lassa Fever, Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis (LCM), Sabia-
associated Hemorrhagic Fever, and Venezuelan Hemorrhagic Fever. 
Pathophysiology 
Arenaviridae viral infection begins in the nasal and oropharyngeal mucosa 
and spreads throughout the body's cells. The cells are infected but not killed by 
the viruses. It is thought that these viruses infect the macrophages and cause them 
to erroneously produce inflammatory cytokines. These cytokines cause leaking of 
the blood vessels which progresses to hemorrhage (Dr. J. Aronson, personal 
communication, October 14, 2002). Hemorrhage is aided by the prevention of 
platelet aggregation, caused by a circulating platelet inhibitor and 
thrombocytopenia. Disseminated intravascular coagulation is not a central 
pathogenic mechanism. Lassa fever appears to be terminated by a cellular, not 
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humoral, immune response, whereas in New World Arenaviruses, recovery is 
preceded by cellular and humoral immune responses (Borio eta!., 2002) 
Epidemiology 
The geographic distribution and habitats of the specific rodents that are the 
hosts of the virus determine the endemic area and groups of at risk. Argentine, 
Bolivian, and Venezuelan Hemorrhagic fevers occur in the countries for which 
they are named at a rate of several hundred cases per year. Lassa fever is endemic 
to West Africa and where thousands of cases are seen each year. Each virus is 
carried by a specific rodent species. According to Dr. Aronson (personal 
communication, October 14, 2002), approximately I% of those that contract 
Lassa fever actually die, although during an epidemic in Nigeria in 1969 the case 
fatality was as high as 50%. 
Dispersal and Transmission 
Arenaviridae viruses are transmitted through inhalation of aerosols present 
in rodent urine and feces, by ingestion of food contaminated with rodent waste, or 
by direct contact of rodent waste with non-intact skin and mucous membranes. 
Person-to-person transmission of these viruses occurs predominantly by direct 
contact with infectious blood and bodily fluids. Nosocomial outbreaks have been 
documented as well and are suspected to have contributed to the Nigerian 
outbreak in 1969 (Borio et a!., 2002). 
Incubation 
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The incubation period varies in length depending on the virus in question. 
Incubation rates range from 6- 17 days (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Symptoms 
The signs and symptoms vary by the type of virus but initial signs and 
symptoms often include marked fever, muscle aches, headaches, and abdominal 
pain. In addition, exudative pharyngitis is seen in Lassa fever. In severe cases, 
vascular damage, platelet dysfunction, and thrombcytopenia cause mucosal 
bleeding and shock (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Diagnosis 
Diagnostic tests for the illnesses caused by the Arenaviridae viruses 
include demonstrating virus specific IgM, an increase in IgG antibody titers in 
serial serum specimens, viral isolation, or by identifying the viral antigen in blood 
or tissues (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
There is no treatment or established cure for viral hemorrhagic fevers 
other than supportive care. Ribavirin, an anti-viral drug, has been effective in 
treating some individuals with Lassa fever or HFRS. Treatment with 
convalescent-phase plasma has been used with success in some patients with 
Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever, reducing the associated mortality from 15 to 30% 
in untreated patients to less than 1% in those receiving appropriate quantities 
(CDC Special Pathogens 2002; American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). Contact 
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precautions are recommended as well as consideration for additional precautions 
in the event of massive hemorrhage (Franz et a!., 1997). 
Prevention 
There is no licensed vaccine to prevent transmission of any of the viruses 
caused by the Arenaviridae viruses however, there is limited experimental 
evidence that post-exposure prophylaxis with Ribavirin will delay onset of disease 
(Borio et a!., 2002; American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
BUNYAVIRIDAE 
Like the Arenaviridae viruses, the Bunyaviridae family is made up of 
viruses each having a distinct endemic area and reservoir. Hantavirus has a I rodent reservoir but no arthropod vector, whereas Bunyavirus, Nairovirus, and 
Phlebovirus involve animal or bird reservoirs and arthropod vectors. 
Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS), Hemorrhagic fever with 
pulmonary syndrome (HFPS), Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), Rift 
Valley fever (RVF), and Hantaan virus are all members of the Bunyaviridae virus 
family (North Dakota Department of Health, 2002). 
Pathophysiology 
Like all Hemorrhagic Fever agents, the Bunyaviridae viruses are small 
RNA viruses with lipid envelopes. According to the Working Group on Civilian 
i 
i 
Biodefense (2002), data on the pathogenesis of these agents is incomplete. What 
is known is that the viruses lead to thrombocytopenia, and in the case ofRVF 
reduced levels of coagulation factors may lead to disseminated intravascular 
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coagulation. RVF, unlike the Arenaviridae viruses destroy the cells they infect. 
A hypothesis regarding RVF is that it causes a combination of vasculitis and 
hepatic necrosis. Research using Interferon Alfa as a post-exposure prophylaxis is 
underway, but still in the primate phase (Borio et al., 2002) 
Epidemiology 
HFRS occurs throughout Europe, Asia, and the Balkan states. Hantaan 
virus causes infections in specific species of mice that then leave behind 
infectious waste products. When the aerosols from these wastes are inhaled, the 
disease is acquired. The most severe form of the disease is found in rural Asia 
and the Balkans. Laboratory workers have reported cases after having contacted 
infected rodents (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
The Hantavirus is associated with HFPS from rodent waste and was first 
identified in the Southeastern United States in 1993. It is endemic to the United 
States, Canada, and regions of South America (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
1997). 
Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) is a tick-borne virus that was 
frrst isolated in Africa and later in the former Soviet Union. It is now found 
commonly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, West and Central Asia, and 
Eastern Europe. Nosocomial infections are a serious risk related to this illness 
(American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
RVF also occurs throughout sub-Saharan Africa and has caused an 
epidemic in Egypt in 1977 affecting over 200,000 people, and killing over 600 of 
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them. It is an arthropod-borne virus transmitted from animals to humans by 
mosquito vectors (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
There are over 300 members ofthe Bunyaviridae family that are 
arthropod-borne, with mosquitoes or ticks serving as vectors. The Hantavirus 
genus is an exception in this family of viruses as it does not have an arthropod 
vector but rather is spread in the same manner as the Arenaviridae virus, that is, 
through inhaled aerosols released from the urine and feces of infected rodents 
(North Dakota Department of Health, 2002). 
CCHF is transmitted by tick and occasionally at an animal slaughter. The 
arthropod vector for RVF is the mosquito. Like CCHF it can be transmitted 
during the slaughter of animals. 
Incnbation 
The incubation period for CCHF and RVF ranges from 2- 10 days. For 
HFRS the incubation period can be as long as 9- 40 days. HPS is thought to have 
an incubation period of one to three weeks although it has not been definitively 
established (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Symptoms 
The clinical presentation varies depending on the viral agent. Symptoms 
of HFRS include fever flushing conjunctival injection, abdominal pain, lumbar 
pain, hypotension, oliguria, vascular instability, and renal insufficiency (American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
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Respiratory failure and shock are late signs ofHFPS. Earlier symptoms 
include nonspecific signs such as fever and myalgia, gastrointestinal disturbances, 
dizziness, hemoconcentration, hyoalbuminemia, throbocytopenia, arterial oxygen 
desaturation, and pulmonary edema (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Fever, headache, and myalgia, followed by capillary leak syndrome with resultant 
facial suffusion, conjunctivitis and proteinuria are symptoms of CCHF. 
Bradycardia, hypotensive crisis and diffuse hemorrhage from the GI tract, the 
mouth, nose and uterus follow (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Unlike the more severe CCHF, HFPS and HFRS, RVF is usually a self-
limiting febrile illness. Patients occasionally develop hemorrhage, shock, 
bleeding, encephalitis, retinitis, or hepatitis (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
1997). 
Diagnosis 
The causative virus for CCHF and RVF can be recovered from the blood 
and tissues of infected patients. Serum IgM and IgG antibodies develop during 
the convalescent phase of these viruses. IgM and IgG antibodies are usually 
detectable within 48 hours of the onset of the illness in HPS and HFRS. 
Neutralizing antibody tests are also useful for diagnosis as they provide greater 
virus strain specificity (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
The treatment for the viral illness caused by the Bunyaviridae viruses 
varies according to the viral strain. For example, HFRS is treated with supportive 
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therapy aimed at preservation of the kidneys. Treatments include prevention of 
over hydration with crystalloids, dialysis of complications of renal failure, 
supportive care for shock, control of hypertension during the oliguic phase, and 
avoidance of transportation of patient (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Treatment for HFPS is similar to HFRS except that the primary focus is on 
the pulmonary system including prevention of hypoxemia, maintenance of 
adequate tissue perfusion without exacerbation of pulmonary capillary leak 
syndrome. Treatment for CCHF is supportive. Ribavirin, when given 
intravenously is helpful in reducing symptoms especially in HFRS. Controlled 
studies are lacking on the efficacy ofRibavirin in the treatment ofRVF and 
CCHF (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). 
Prevention 
There is no licensed vaccine for any of the hemorrhagic fever viruses 
(Borio eta!., 2002). Spread of the disease can be decreased by the use of strict 
isolation precautions in patient care, specimen collection, and specimen 
transportation (Fauci, eta!., 1994). 
FILOVIRIDAE 
Filoviridae is the family of viruses containing the Mar burg and Ebo Ia 
viruses. There are four subtypes ofEbola virus: Ivory Coast, Zaire, Sudan, and 
Reston. These viruses cause severe hemorrhagic fever illnesses to humans. 
Primates are susceptible to these viruses as well. Ebola Reston subtype, which 
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does not cause serious illness in humans, is fatal to Primates (North Dakota 
Department of Health, 2002). 
Pathophysiology 
Filoviridae are RNA viruses that may appear in many shapes and have 
lipid envelopes. The replication of the virus is not completely understood. 
Marburg and Ebola virus disease are clinically similar. Marburg virus produces 
lesions in almost every organ. Necrosis can be seen in the lymphoid tissue. 
Damage to platelets and endothelial cells may lead to the hemorrhagic component 
and visceral organs necrose after damage to microcirculation. Filoviridae viruses, 
unlike the Arenaviridae viruses, kill the cells they infect. Disseminated 
intravascular coagulation develops (Borio et a!., 2002). 
Epidemiology 
Filoviridae virus was first recognized in Germany and Yugoslavia in 1967 
in laboratory workers who were working with green monkeys. The virus was 
named Marburg for the site of one of the outbreaks. During that outbreak, 31 
cases were reported, 7 of them were fatal (North Dakota Department of Health, 
2002). 
Since 1967, 18 outbreaks ofEbola or Marburg viruses have been reported 
with approximately 1,500 cases of illness. Most of these cases have occurred in 
Africa. Epidemiologic investigations have shown that these cases occurred after 
contact with infectious body fluids or tissues from infected humans or primates 
(Borio et a!., 2002). 
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Dispersal and Transmission 
It is not known how the virus is transmitted from its natural reservoir to 
humans. In fact, the natural reservoir of the Filoviridae virus is unknown. As 
previously noted these viruses can be spread through close personal contact and of 
course, noscomially (North Dakota Department of Health, 2002). 
Incubation . 
The incubation period ranges from three to nine days for Marburg Virus. l 
L 
Ebola Virus has an incubation period that ranges from four to six days. 
Symptoms 
Ebola and Marburg viruses have similar clinical manifestations. The onset I is characterized by fever, malaise, headache, diarrhea, abdominal pain, 
dehydration, and lethargy. Pharyngitis, dry cough, and pleuritic chest pain soon 
follow, as does maculopapular eruption with desquamatation. Hemorrhagic 
sequelae ensue leading to blood loss, shock, and death. 
Diagnosis 
Viremia coincides with the febrile state of the disease. Diagnostic tests 
include isolation of virus in paired serum samples. The virus can be isolated from 
essentially all body fluids. 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
Serum of convalescing patients has been used to treat Mar burg virus; 
however, its efficacy is questionable, as similar outcomes have been documented 
from patients who did not receive the serum. Other treatments focus on 
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supportive measures. Patients should be treated in accordance with strict isolation 
precautions. Pharmocologic research has not yielded effective treatments (Fauci, 
et al., 1994). Additionally specimens should be handled as recommended by the 
World Health Organization guidelines for infectious material (Fauci et al., 1994). 
Prevention 
There is no effective post-exposure prophylaxis recommended for persons 
with known or suspected exposures to the Filoviridae virus. According to the 
Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, Ribavirin has no utility against 
Filoviridae virus (Borio et al., 2002). 
FLA VIVIRIDAE 
Pathophysiology 
Like the other viruses that cause hemorrhagic fevers, little is known 
regarding the pathogenesis of the Flaviviridae virus. The yellow fever virus, 
unlike the Arenaviridae virus, leads to destruction of infected cells. Hepatocyte 
infection and degeneration is a late sign and is associated with an absence of 
inflarmnation. Even as neutralizing antibodies clear symptoms of viremia, the 
second phase of the illness begins and the patients develop hemorrhage and shock 
(Fauci et al., 1994). 
Epidemiology 
Yellow fever appears in epidemic proportions in the tropical and 
subtropical regions of Asia, Latin and Central America, Africa, Indonesia, and 
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Northern Australia. Annually there are officially reported 5,000 to 6,000 cases in 
Africa and 300-500 cases in Latin America. In 1990 an outbreak in Cameroon 
caused 20,000 cases with 1,000 case fatalities (North Dakota Department of 
Health, 2002). 
Dispersal and Transmission 
The Flaviviridae vnuses are transmitted in cycles involving animals that 
serve as reservoir, arthropods that serve as carriers and humans that serve as the 
fmal host. In yellow fever, the mosquito vector can serve as a reservoir as well. 
Incubation 
The incubation period for yellow fever is 3 ~ 13 days. Dengue fever 
symptoms have an immediate onset. 
Symptoms 
The initial symptoms of the Flaviviridae Dengue, include high fever, 
headaches, and myalgia, followed by increased myalgia and bone pain, anorexia, 
nausea, vomiting, skin rashes, and weakness. After two to five days it worsens 
and symptoms include restlessness, irritability, tachypnea, tachycardia, and 
hypotension. Finally spontaneous hemorrhage and death occur. (North Dakota 
Department of Health, 2002). 
Yellow Fever, a disease caused by the Flaviviridae virus, begins abruptly 
with fever, chills, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, and minor bleeding. After three 
days jaundice, dehydration, and severe hemorrhages appear. Death usually occurs 
during the 7th to 1 O'h day of illness as a result of extensive liver damage. This fmal 
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stage is generally preceded by deepened jaundice, uncontrolled hemorrhages, 
rising pulse, agitated delirium, and coma (North Dakota Department of Health, 
2002). 
Diagnosis 
Diagnosis is made by serologic testing or viral isolation, techniques that 
are only available in a few states, research, and reference labs (American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 1997). Additionally, the World Health Organization has 
established criteria for the diagnosis of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (Fauci et at., 
1994). 
Treatment and Isolation Precautions 
Treatment is support, the main goal being prevention of circulatory 
collapse by infusion of crystalloids. Transfusion of blood is not recommended, 
although plasma or plasma volume expanders can be used. Oxygen should be 
administered. During an epidemic in Cuba in 1981, Interferon was used with 
some indication of efficacy, although controlled studies have not been performed 
for tills treatment modality (Fauci, et a!., 1997). Antibiotics are not recommended 
Prevention 
With the exception of yellow fever vaccine, there is no licensed vaccine 
for any of the HFVs. The yellow fever vaccine is not useful for post-exposure 
prophylaxis because its incubation period is shorter than the time it would take for 
the body to develop antibodies after inununization (Borio et a!., 2002). Vector 
control is the only method available to prevent hemorrhagic fevers. 
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CHAPTER III 
Bioterrorism and The Role of Occupational Health Professionals 
The Role of Occupational Health 
Each day, an average of9,000 U.S. workers sustain disabling injuries on 
the job, 16 workers die from injuries sustained at work, and 137 workers die from 
work-related diseases (NIOSH, 2002). Occupational health, as a specialty of 
public health, strives to protect workers' health and to ensure a safe work L 
environment Policies and interventions to meet these goals are implemented on 
population levels and organization levels impacting and protecting groups or 
1 
aggregate populations. Two organizations created to improve the safety of the I work environment and to protect the health of workers are the National Institute ) 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA). NIOSH is an agency that works to improve the 
safety of workers by conducting research and recommending interventions that 
prevent work-related illness and injury. It is an agency of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). NIOSH conducts research, investigates 
hazardous working conditions, make recommendations on how to prevent work 
related illness, injury, and disability; and provides training to occupational safety 
and health professionals. OSHA, a division of the United States Department of 
Labor (DOL), develops standards designed to protect workers from hazards, 
enforces the standards, and provides consultation to employers to assist in 
becoming compliant with the standards. They also perform inspections when 
requested to do so by employees, or when there has been an incident such as a 
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death or 'near miss' (an incident that could have resulted in a death or severe 
injury). These two orgairizations are the governmental entities that lead the field 
of occupational health. Occupational health is made up of professionals from a 
variety of disciplines such as occupational health nursing, industrial hygiene, 
toxicology, occupational safety, ergonomics, and occupational medicine. Each of 
these fields strives to ensure safe working conditions. For example, when anthrax 
spores were found in government buildings and postal facilities, the contaminated 
buildings were closed for investigation and decontamination measures. NIOSH 
then published recommendations for protecting workers from anthrax. (NIOSH, 
2001). Work site evaluations established which processes were likely to result in 
an exposure and, control measures were determined based on those evaluations. 
Occupational health professionals carried out each of these activities. 
Cooperative efforts among disciplines were required to investigate the large 
volume of suspected exposures. 
The Role of the Occupational Health Nurse 
The OHN has a distinctive education, encompassing a combination of 
fields that provide a valuable range of services to the worker population she or he 
serves. This philosophy and education work together to qualifY the OHN to play 
an important role in relation to a potential bioterrorism attack. Beaton and 
Murphy (2002) stated: 
"OHNs are uniquely qualified to help during a biochemical warfare 
(BCW) event by virtue of their health care training and by their 
preparatory course work in toxicology. Furthermore, they are positioned 
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in the community to assess the risk ofBCW terrorist event at their 
workplaces" (p. 187). 
An awareness of the signs and symptoms of the common bioterrorism 
agents, a working knowledge of epidemiology principles, ability to monitor for 
patterns of illness, and a working relationship with public health officials in 
community preparedness and disaster management all enable the OHN to 
recognize a potential bioterrorism event and report it to the appropriate agency. 
Additionally, the leadership and management responsibilities associated with the 
role, oblige the OHN to implement policies and training aimed at preventing 
injuries and illness in the event of a disaster. 
Occupational health nursing practice expertise is broad and dynamic. 
Rogers (1998) describes nine essential elements of occupational health services, 
each of which has implications for bioterrorism. These elements include: 
Worker/workplace assessment and surveillance, occupational health care and 
primary care, case management, health promotion and protection, counseling, 
management and administration, community orientation, research/trend analysis, 
legal and ethical monitoring. 
Worker/Workplace Assessment 
Assessment and surveillance of the workplace is essential to identify 
potential hazards (Rogers, 1998). Worker assessment should include the 
educational level of the workforce to determine what would be the most 
appropriate method to present information to the workers (Rogers, 1994). It is 
important that the OHN educate the workforce about the risks of a bioterrorism 
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attack in a manner that is concise, straight forward, and appropriate to their level ~--
of understanding. The OHN should also know the general health of the worker 
population and whether or not there are any employees that have special physical 
needs who may require extra assistance during an evacuation. Since older 
workers or workers with decreased immune systems may be more susceptible to 
infections, the OHN should make note of the presence of these special 
populations (Sue Willis, personal communication, October 15, 2002) 
L 
An assessment should also be made of the physical environment including 
location of emergency exits and evacuation routes. The ventilation system is a 
principle consideration with respect to bioterrorism since most bioweapons can be l 
disseminated via aerosolization. The location of the intake duct should be noted I and it should be in an area that is protected from access by the general public. 
Determination of airflow through the facility is an important part of the workplace 
assessment. It will be necessary to move workers toward fresh air in the event of 
an attack. Oscillating fans may be helpful and should be easily accessible. If such 
an attack were made via the ventilation system, workers should be moved away 
from areas of high airflow. Sufficient personal protective equipment such as 
masks and gloves should be available for the entire employee population and 
should be stored in an easily accessible area (Sue Willis, personal communication, 
October 15, 2002). 
While most organizations do not present a likely target for a terrorist 
attack, certain industries, corporations, and sites might be targeted for terrorist 
attacks based on their symbolic value, the products they manufacture, or the 
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service they provide (Beaton & Murphy 2002). For example, the location of the 
facility can increase its vulnerability to attack. Being in close proximity to a 
sensitive facility such as a military instillation, government agency, or storage 
location for weapons increases the risk of being affected by a bioterrorism attack. 
The Office of the Governor ofNorth Carolina Crime Control offers a self-
assessment tool to allow organizations to assess their risk of being targeted for a 
terrorist attack (NC Office of the Governor 2002) (Appendix A). This form can 
be adopted for use in any organization as a starting point for the OHN to perform 
risk assessment and plan ways to reduce risk through preparation. 
Occupational Health Care and Primary Care 
As a clinician, the OHN provides direct care including treatment, follow-
up, referral for medical care, and emergency care to the population of workers 
within the employing facility (Rogers 1994). Many of the diseases resulting from 
biological agents have incubation periods of several days and present with similar, 
non-specific symptoms. Because these illnesses do not necessarily have an acute 
onset, it is feasible that people will frrst display symptoms in the workplace. It is 
also possible that non-emergency health care providers [such as OHNs] will be 
the frrst to see this type of evidence of a biological attack (Franz et al., 1997). 
Specific activities of the OHN during any patient encounter include taking 
a thorough history of the patient's present illness, a review of systems, a problem 
focused examination, diagnostic tests as available, and treatment, referral, or post-
exposure prophylaxis as appropriate. These activities should be performed in 
accordance with written medical and nursing protocols consistent with state legal 
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requirements (Rogers 1994). Clusters of unusual symptoms or large numbers of 
persons with 'flu-like" illness could be indicative of a bioterrorism attack. These 
occurrences should be reported to the local board of health for initiation of 
outbreak investigation. 
Case Management 
The OHN role in case management is to assist employees in returning to 
work from both occupational and non-occupational illness and injury (Tourigian, 
2002). Key post injury and illness case management activities include: immediate 
medical management, obtaining a supervisors report of injury of illness, ongoing 
communication with employee, supervisor, and health care provider, and timely 
referral to a specialist when appropriate. 
When the employee is able to work, a transitional duty program may be 
needed to allow the worker to return to a safe and productive environment. 
Transitional duty is an interim step allowing the employee to work in a modified 
capacity (Haag & Kalina 2002). Work hardening and physical reconditioning can 
prepare the employee to return to the workplace after a long or debilitating illness. 
Reduced working hours and lifting limits are examples of job modifications that 
can enable the employee to work safely in a productive but less demanding 
capacity. For example, all but one of the workers who developed inhalation 
anthrax after exposure to contaminated mail in October 2001 remained off work 
for at least six months. During their absences, the case managers' role would 
include monitoring their progress and assisting them in negotiating the worker's 
compensation system. As they return to their workplaces, OHN case managers 
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should transition them back into their positions through plans tailored specifically 
to their individual abilities, and revising the plan as the employees' conditions 
allow or dictate until they are able to return to unrestricted duty. 
The OHN must also consider the other employees' risk of exposure due to 
contact with a worker who has developed an illness and whether the workforce 
needs prophylactic treatment such as cipro for anthrax, or preventive 
immunizations based on communicability and transmission of the illness. In 
addition the OHN has access to absence and illness data for the worker population 
either through policies that designate the OHN as the appropriate person to notifY 
if one is absent due to illness, or by working with those who handle disability and 
sick calls, for example, the human resources department or employees' direct 
supervisors. Access to this information is vital in the detection of patterns of 
illness. For example workers exposed to anthrax may 'call in sick' to work and 
report flu-like symptoms. A large number of employees who report similar 
symptoms within a short period of time should trigger suspicion of an outbreak 
and a call to the local health department (Shenold, 2001). 
Health Promotion and Protection 
Health promotion and protection strategies are aimed at individual, group, 
and population levels. They are designed to guard the individual or group against 
illness or injury. Health protection is achieved through a total range of preventive 
efforts incorporating primary, secondary and tertiary prevention strategies 
(Rogers, 1994 ). 
L 
L 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 66 
Primary prevention approaches are aimed at eliminating or reducing 
disease risk through specific protective actions (Rogers, 1998). Educational 
programs are primary prevention activities. A posted evacuation route to train 
employees to follow a safe evacuation is a primary prevention activity. 
Information on bioterrorism agents presented to the occupational health unit staff 
is primary prevention. This can be facilitated through the use of available 
literature such as the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill's wall chart of 
Bioterrorist Agents (Appendix B). 
Immunizations and personal protective equipment are classic examples of 
primary prevention activities. Identification of workplace hazards through 
workplace assessments, disaster drills, and training about what to do in case of an 
emergency, such as evacuation procedures are also primary prevention activities. 
Secondary prevention is aimed at early detection and diagnosis of 
individuals with disease so prompt interventions can be implemented to halt 
disease progression and limit disability. Medical and health surveillance and 
screening activities such as nasal swabbing for anthrax and pharyngeal swabbing 
for smallpox in patients who have been exposed but are symptom-free are 
examples of secondary prevention. (Rogers, 1998). Again, syndrome surveillance 
is an important concept for the OHN. 
Tertiary prevention is directed at restoration and rehabilitation of 
individuals to an optimal level of health with the limits of the disabling conditions 
(Rogers, 1994). Tertiary care involves a return to work program that can allow 
restrictions to be tailored to the employees' level of functioning. For example, 
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after contracting an illness resulting from a bioterrorist attack such as anthrax, an 
employee may have recovered sufficiently to return to work although it is likely 
that the employee may need modified job duties such as reduced number of hours 
in the workday, permission to sit or stand intermittently as tolerated, or perhaps 
sitting work only until the employee has regained sufficient strength to perform 
pre-illness job duties. Employees can work with the OHN to determine 
appropriate work restrictions when returning from an illness. 
Counseling 
According to Beaton and Murphy, (2002) disaster research has found mass 
violence to be the most psychologically disturbing type of disaster and that as 
many as 67% of those exposed are impaired to some degree with any one of a 
number of maladaptive psychosocial responses and symptoms. There are few 
research studies evaluating the effectiveness of psychological interventions 
following episodes of mass violence such as a bioterrorism attack; however, 
research from other types of traumatic events indicate that early, brief, focused 
psychotherapeutic intervention can reduce distress in the bereaved, that selected 
cognitive behavioral approaches may help reduce incidence, duration, and 
severity of acute and post-traumatic stress disorders and depression in survivors, 
and that early interventions do not consistently reduce the incidence of the 
development of post-traumatic stress disorder later (National Institute of Mental 
Health, 2002). 
Techniques for psychosocial intervention such as crisis intervention, 
critical incident stress debriefmg, and stress reduction can be initiated in the 
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workplace by the OHN trained in these techniques. Sessions could be arranged 
for workers and their families in groups or individually. Traumatic events affect 
people in a variety of ways. Not only are there differences in how individuals 
react, but also certain categories of people have special needs in regard to 
counseling after a disaster. These include women, children, the elderly, the 
disabled, and refugees (Ehrenreich, 2001 ). The formation of support groups in 
the work place to meet the needs of these special populations may be indicated. 
The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Victims of Crime (2001) 
describes an array of emotions that victims of terrorism are likely to experience 
including shock and numbness, intense emotion, fear, guilt, anger and resentment, 
depression, panic, inability to resume normal activity, and delayed reactions. 
These reactions are outlined in their publication along with practical coping 
strategies aimed at individuals. This easy to read publication can be made 
available to workers as a resource. The OHN may benefit from a more in-depth 
resource that outlines techniques such as critical incident stress debriefmg and 
crisis intervention. OHNs have the training and communication skills needed to 
reassure 'the worried well' and their families and to recognize the signs and 
symptoms of more serious psychiatric disorders in workers resulting from a 
bioterrorism threat or actual episode (Beaton & Murphy, 2002). OHNs can offer 
individual or group counseling when appropriate, or for those workers having a 
more difficult time adjusting, referral through Employee Assistance Program or 
other available resource is appropriate. 
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Management and Administration 
The OHN performs leadership functions in communicating the need for 
appropriate policies and interventions to administrators and workers alike. The 
OHN will need to ensure that medical directives are in place and signed by the 
medical director. Directives should include considerations for infection control, 
diagnostic testing procedures such as nasal swabbing for anthrax, and post-
exposure prophylaxis such as distribution of medications if available. Policies i 
L 
pertaining to bioterrorism should be drafted based on an authoritative source such 
as the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), should be approved the 
medical director, and should be reviewed and updated yearly as recommendations 
are continually revised (Rogers, 1994). Policies should include specific criteria i for notifYing authorities of a suspected outbreak as well as what specific agency 
and department to notifY. 
The occupational health unit staff needs to be trained regarding the 
common bioterrorism pathogens, their symptoms, diagnostic tests, prevention, 
prophylaxis, treatment, and isolation precautions. There are many resources 
available that provide this information in table form, such as from the University 
ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill (see Appendix B). The OHN should form a 
bioterrorism or disaster committee of persons from several disciplines within the 
workplace. Plant engineering or maintenance would be valuable because they 
will be most familiar with the physical layout of the facility and with the 
ventilation system. Safety and industrial hygiene representatives should be 
involved as should the first responders or first-aid team and the occupational 
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health unit because they are all familiar with health measures, proper usage of 
personal protective equipment, and the importance of evacuation from a 
contaminated area to a safer area. There should be a member of the management 
team or administration, and from the general work population on the committee 
so that decisions can be approved quickly (Sue Willis, personal communication, 
October 15, 2002). 
The Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology 
L 
(2002) published a bioterrorism readiness plan called the template for healthcare 
facilities, and a mass casualty disaster plan checklist that can both be downloaded 
off their website free of charge. These plans can be tailored to non-healthcare 
organizations and can provide direction for the OHN and the disaster committee I to form a company specific plan. The specific disaster response plan formulated 
by this committee should be instituted as policy. The plan should be 
disseminated to the worker population and evaluated by performing disaster drills, 
which could be critiqued by the disaster committee for effectiveness. For 
example, did the workers respond to the alarm/notification promptly, did they 
evacuate or report to the designated area in a timely manner, was personal 
protective equipment used, was the area secured by the security officers, were 
notifications made to the health department, etc. The frequency of the drills could 
be based on the outcome of the vulnerability assessment performed. For example, 
a highly vulnerable facility may institute quarterly drills where as a facility that 
scored low on the vulnerability assessment may choose to perform an armual 
disaster drill. 
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Community Orientation 
According to Rogers (1994) the field of occupational health nursing has 
incorporated the concepts and principles of public health, focusing on prevention, 
education, management, and mitigation of workplace and community health 
hazards. The field of occupational health nursing has continued to use knowledge 
gained from public health and nursing to improve worker health through 
preventive and health promotion activities. 
It is essential that OHNs network with the public health agencies in their 
communities. Most communities have an emergency management team or 
disaster team. Generally this is a cooperative effort lead by the public health 
department, that includes local hospitals, emergency service agencies, law I enforcement, and fire prevention (D. Oeding, personal communication, October 
17, 2002). The Red Cross, universities, and sometimes the local school systems 
are involved in these task forces as well. 
The OHN should contact the public health department and insure that a 
designated member of the occupational health unit staffs name is on the 
community's "call down list" or emergency notification list. This helps to ensure 
that the OHN is notified in the event of a health disaster that might threaten the 
workplace. Additionally the OHN should attend the disaster team meetings and 
know what the chain of command is in the community, and if possible, participate 
in countywide disaster drills. OHNs should also network with other companys' 
OHNs to help disseminate information. 
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OHNs should learn about the community's contingency plans for a 
bioterrorist attack, and what health care facility and emergency medical services 
are central to the coordinated effort of the community, what facility will be used 
for a quarantine hospital if needed, what will be used for a temporary morgue, and 
what mode of transportation will be used to transport mass casualties. In such a 
disaster, all clinicians, regardless of specialty, will be essential in partnering with 
public health to provide assistance. 
Research ffrend analysis 
As previously stated, the military has been performing research on 
bioterrorism weapons for many decades. The Johns Hopkins Center for 
Biodefense Strategies was founded in 1990s "to guide policy and practice that 
will reduce the likelihood that biological weapons are used, and, should 
prevention fail, lessen the suffering and consequences that would result from their 
use" (Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, 2002). Between these two 
sources alone, abundant information on bioterrorism exists. Current research in 
nursing literature suggests that there are numerous nursing implications for 
bioterrorism such as becoming familiar with bioterrorism agents, their symptoms, 
prophylaxis, prevention, and treatment, disaster preparedness for a bioterrorism 
attack, crisis management, and participation with community disaster response 
teams (Gwerder, Beaton & Daniell, 2001). Additionally, new research should be 
conducted to find ways to minimize potential hazards involved in a bioterrorism 
attack. 
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The National Occupational Research Agenda's research priorities include 
areas pertinent to bioterrorism, for example, infectious disease, emerging 
technologies, in-door enviromnents, control technology and personal protective 
equipment, and risk assessment methods. It is essential that OHNs take advantage 
of the information that exists and learn what they can about bioterrorism: the 
company's risk for an attack, the signs and symptoms of the illnesses related to an 
attack, who to contact if they suspect an attack, and how to help those who have 
been the victim of an attack. One specific need is information regarding 
scarification- the technique used to give the smallpox vaccine. Because this 
vaccine was discontinued in the 1970s and no other routinely given vaccine is 
administered using this technique, there are currently very few practicing nurses 
familiar it. If public health leaders determine that it is necessary to immunize the 
public against smallpox, thousands of people will have to be inoculated in a 
matter of days using a technique unfamiliar to most nurses (D. Oeding, personal 
communication, October 16, 2002). This is important information that OHNs and 
all nurses need to be reviewing now. 
OHNs must be familiar with the principles of epidemiology in order to 
assimilate all of the available illness and injury data and monitor for patterns or 
trends in illness. OHNs must utilize their knowledge of epidemiological principles 
related to monitoring for illness including surveillance by syndrome. OHNs must 
make it a priority to learn the common bioterrorism agents, their symptoms, 
incubation periods, modes of transmission, and methods of dispersal. According 
to Franz, et al (1997), 
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"Many, if not most, diseases caused by weaponized biological agents 
present with nonspecific signs and symptoms that could be misinterpreted 
as natural occurrences. The disease pattern that develops is an important 
factor in differentiating between a natural and a terrorist or warfare attack. 
In most naturally occurring epidemics, there is a gradual rise in disease 
incidence, as people are progressively exposed to an increasing number of 
patients, vectors, or fomites that spread the pathogen. In contrast, those 
exposed to a bioweapons attack would all come in contact with the agent 
at approximately the same time" (p. 409). 
By understanding the epidemiological presentations of a natural outbreak versus a 
terrorist attack the OHN has objective information to report to the local health 
department and will likely have a rapid response by officials who will investigate 
the outbreak. 
Legal and Ethical Monitoring 
Ethical issues abound in the workplace under normal circumstances but 
the OHN faces even more challenges in ethical decision-making during times of 
crisis. Guided by a code of ethics, the nurse is obliged to act in the best interest of 
the individuals and larger society (Rogers 1998). For example, confidentiality is 
an important consideration. If workers are exposed to a communicable disease at 
work such as smallpox, the OHN must protect confidentiality in the workplace of 
those exposed as well as the exposing party. 
Another ethical consideration is making sure that employees who have 
been exposed to a pathogen are notified that they have been exposed and that an 
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informed consent is obtained prior to diagnostic and treatment procedures. 
Informed consent is not only an ethical issue but also a patient's legal right 
(University of Washington, 1998). If the treatment is an investigational drug, the 
risks and benefits of its use must be thoroughly explained to the patient. Further, 
exposed parties must be informed of the risks posed to their family members if 
they don't follow through with reporting symptoms and complying with 
treatment. 
Thorough teaching by the OHN regarding the pathogens that are likely to 
be used in a bioterrorism attack presented to the workforce can give an 
introduction to the importance of reporting symptoms and complying with 
treatment. Diseases that can be transmitted from person to person, such as 
smallpox may result in the quarantine of workers who are suspected of having 
been exposed. Only the health department has the authority to quarantine and this 
order must come from County Health Officer (D. Oeding, personal 
communication, October 16, 2002). Unless the OHN has obtained instruction 
from the state to initiate a quarantine order, the rights of others will be violated. 
The OHN is an important asset to employers and employees alike. The 
OHN is often the first provider workers seek out for healthcare; however, as 
illustrated in the preceding discussion, occupational health nursing is not limited 
to treating work injuries and preventing illnesses. This role is broad and dynamic, 
involving many facets. With evolving threats such as bioterrorism, OHNs are 
realizing even more workplace implications. 
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The OHN has an opportunity to identifY unusual trends of illness that 
might signal a potential bioterrorism attack through the application of OHN 
principles. Knowledge of the signs and symptoms of the common bioterrorism 
agents, epidemiology principles, symptom surveillance, and a working 
relationship with local public health officials in community preparedness and 
disaster management enable the OHN to contribute to the recognition of a 
potential bioterrorism event. Additionally, well thought out and implemented 
policies and training programs can prevent injuries and illness in the event of a 
disaster. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A bioterrorism attack involving the release of any one of a number of 
pathogens may manifest in an insidious manner in the workplace. Due to 
prolonged incubation periods, those exposed may not display symptoms until 
days or even weeks later. Even then, the symptoms may be vague and general. 
Victims may continue to work possibly exposing coworkers to illness. They may 
report their symptoms to the OHN at work before seeking treatment elsewhere. 
OHNs must be aware of this new threat in the workplace and utilize the broad 
background unique to occupational health nursing to address the occupational 
health implications ofbioterrorism. 
The essential components of occupational health nursing practice can 
enable the OHN to contribute to the timely recognition of a bioterrorist attack. It 
is important that the OHN understand the implications of such an attack and apply 
their knowledge to prepare and respond appropriately. This means that as 
occupational health nursing practice relates to bioterrorism it is recommended that 
the OHN be engaged in several ways including: 
1) Knowledge acquisition of bioterrorism and bioterrorism agents 
2) Familiarization with resources available at federal, state, and local 
levels 
3) Participation in disaster planning and preparedness activities both 
at the workplace and within the community, including 
vo lunteerism 
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4) Education of workers, management, and colleagues regarding 
bioterrorism pathogens, disaster preparedness, and appropriate 
response to such an occurrence 
5) Assistance to smaller worksites that do not have medical or nursing 
services on site or otherwise available to help them prepare for a 
bioterrorism attack 
6) Support of legislation that increases funding to strengthen the 
public health ability to respond to a bioterrorism disaster 
7) Utilization of current research regarding bioterrorism and its 
implications 
First, the OHN must become familiar with the pathogens that are the most 
likely to be used as bioweapons including signs and symptoms, incubation 
periods, dispersal and transmission, epidemiology, pathophysiology, diagnostic 
tests, treatments, prophylaxis, and prevention. Nurses and other health care 
providers will be the "on the front lines" in recognition of these pathogens. 
Equally important, OHNs must perform symptom surveillance utilizing principles 
of epidemiology. The OHN has an advantage over most caregivers by working 
with a population of people on a regular basis. This allows the OHN to monitor 
the health of that population for the sometimes subtle, early symptoms associated 
with most of the pathogens in question. In an actual bioterrorism attack, the OHN 
will speed up the recognition of an illness outbreak by the timely reporting of 
unusual patterns of illness. Additionally the OHN must be vigilant in surveying 
the worksite for potential threats. For example, taking note of people at the 
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worksite who are not authorized to be there, observing suspicious bags or parcels 
left unattended or in unusual places, or identifYing unusual odors, each of these 
events could indicate an attack is taking place. The importance of these activities 
cannot be overstated. 
A second important recommendation is that OHNs locate available L 
resources essential in the contingency plan for a bioterrorist attack. Resources are 
available on federal, state, and local levels. 
The most important federal level govermnental resource with regards to 
bioterrorism is the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC), a division 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The CDC works to 
I promote health through disease prevention. Over a dozen centers, institutes, and offices make up the CDC. It plays a critical role in controlling diseases by 
performing outbreak investigations and conducting research related to infectious 
disease. The CDC has an abundance of information pertaining to bioterrorism 
and bioterrorism agents on their website, including a separate site, the Special 
Pathogens Branch, which deals primarily with the pathogens that cause the viral 
hemorrhagic fevers. Telephone numbers for contacting the CDC are also 
available on their website. 
The Federal Bureau ofinvestigations (FBI) must be notified in the event 
of a suspected bioterrorism attack. One division of the FBI is the 
Counterterrorism Division. One of its branches is the National Domestic 
Preparedness Office (NDPO). This office coordinates all federal efforts to assist 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 80 
state and local first responders with planning, training, and equipment needed for 
response to attacks involving any variety of weapons of mass destruction. 
Another important federal resource is the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). FEMA is an independent agency reporting directly to the 
President of the United States, in charge of responding to, planning for, 
recovering from, and minimizing the effects of disasters. Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 the agency has focused on issues of national 
preparedness including the training and equipping the nation's first responders to 
deal with weapons of mass destruction. They have published a tool to assist in 
planning for a terrorist incident. Health and medical needs are only one section of 
this comprehensive planning tool, which address all forms of terrorism. The 
OHN could use this tool in place of or in addition to the Terrorism Vulnerability 
Assessment previously discussed. The OHN will need to become knowledgeable 
about the Office of Homeland Security and how occupational health and safety 
interacts with this newly created agency. 
The OHN should also have contact numbers for state resources including 
the State Department of Health, which may encompass many smaller offices and 
agencies such as the State Epidemiologist's Office, the State Emergency 
Management Agency, and State Laboratories. 
The State Department of Health will be in charge of coordinating the 
efforts of various state level agencies in response to a bioterrorism attack. For 
example, the State Epidemiologist's office will be responsible for outbreak 
investigation, and state laboratories will conduct specialized tests to confirm 
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diagnoses that local laboratories do not have the capability to conduct. Other state 
level resources available include written guides such as Indiana's "State Public 
Health Emergencies Manual" and North Carolina's Vulnerability Assessment 
Tool. 
The OHN should have formal contact with the community through the 
local health department and with the local emergency management agency. The 
local health departments will be responsible for coordinating all local health 
L 
agencies' efforts in response to a bioterrorism attack and will work closely with 
state level public health agencies. The local emergency management agency will 
work closely with health departments. Establishing temporary medical facilities, 
alternative modes of transporting the victims, and alternative means of 
communication are all important considerations in disaster/ mass casualty 
preparedness that will be arranged by these two agencies. 
Third, the OHN should be familiar with and an active participant in the 
local disaster plan. The OHN should be knowledgeable about voluntary 
community agencies that are important to any disaster planning and relief such as 
the American Red Cross, the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT), 
and Citizen Corps Councils. The CERT program helps train people to respond to 
emergency situations in their communities, supporting to first responders, 
assisting victims, organizing volunteers at disaster sites, and collecting disaster 
intelligence to support first responder efforts. Citizen Corps programs guide local 
citizens' participation by coordinating and developing community action plans, +-
assessing possible threats, and identifying local resources. Attendance at county 
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disaster team meetings as well as participation in the local disaster drills and 
volunteer activities will keep the OHN informed oflocal plans and procedures in 
the event of a disaster. The American Red Cross, the National Disaster Medical 
System, and the Medical Reserve Corps all provide volunteer opportunities in 
which the OHN could participate. 
The OHN should be knowledgeable regarding the location of area medical 
facilities in order to be able to direct victims to the appropriate facility. Hospitals, 
trauma centers, emergency rooms, and urgent care centers will all participate in 
the care of victims of a bioterrorist attack. Victims should be triaged and directed 
to the appropriate care facility. 
After assessing risks, gathering appropriate emergency notification 
information related to bioterrorism, and participating in disaster planning within 
the community, the OHN should formulate a disaster response plan for the 
workplace utilizing a multidisciplinary team approach. The plan should be 
outlined in written policies. Emergency equipment must be readily available and 
contingencies must be made for alternative power sources, modes of 
communication, and evacuation. This plan must be disseminated to employees 
and evaluated through periodic disaster drills. 
A fourth recommendation is education of workers, management, and 
colleagues. Workers should be informed about threats at the workplace and how 
to respond appropriately through their company disaster response plan as stated, 
but they should also be encouraged to make some preparations for their families 
and homes such as a specific plan of where to meet or gather in the event of a 
¥--
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bioterrorist attack (Urbano, 2002). They should also be encouraged to assemble a 
family emergency kit with battery-powered radio, batteries and other emergency 
supplies. FEMA has a section on their web site that can help with family disaster 
planning. This planning kit can be fonnd at 
http://www.fema.gov/library/yfdp.pdf (FEMA 2002). 
-
Education is important for management as well. While managers and 
administrators need to be familiar with the disaster plan at the workplace, safe 
evacuation, use of personal protective equipment, emergency notifications and the 
other factors involved in the actual management of a disaster, they should also be 
educated about the aftermath of a disaster. Mangers must be educated regarding 
occurrence and allow for work-sponsored crisis debriefing, counseling, support I 
' 
the potential flood of emotional difficulties that employees may have after such an 
groups and time away from work as needed. 
Professional education for colleagues is important as well. It has been 
stated multiple times in the current literature that nurses and other primary care 
providers are going to be "on the front lines" in the war against bioterrorism and 
must know the signs and symptoms of the common pathogens (Dr. J. Aronson, 
personal communication, November 14,2002, O'Toole 2002). In addition, OHNs 
should be trained how to effectively contribute during a disaster. They must be !---
trained to triage, perform first aid, and organize other workers on the scene during 
the chaotic aftermath of a bioterrorism attack.. r 
Fifth, the OHN should consider offering to assist in the disaster planning 
for worksites that do not have occupational health and I or safety services. The 
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formulation of emergency polices, assembling of a list of federal, state, and local 
contacts, and the training of employees with regard to how to respond in the event 
of a suspected bioterrorism event are valuable training programs the OHN could 
offer. 
A sixth important recommendation is that oflegislative acumen. The 
OHN must become familiar with and support the legislation that increases 
funding to strengthen the public health ability to respond to a disaster, such as 
Public law 107-108, the "Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of2002." This law makes provisions for funding and outlines 
governmental responsibility in response to a bioterrorism attack from the federal 
to the local level. This type oflegislation may need to be carried into state and I local levels and the OHN will want to be a proactive community member in 
support of these endeavors. 
Finally OHNs must make use of research that is currently being 
disseminated regarding bioterrorism in both the nursing literature as well as 
medical and other related literature. 
The OHN is positioned within the structure of most companies to assume 
the principal lead in disaster preparation activities with regards to a bioterrorism 
attack. Knowledge of bioterrorism and bioterrorism agents, federal, state, and 
local resources, current legislation related bioterrorism, and current research 
related to bioterrorism and its implications all help the OHN prepare for the role 
as the bioterrorism authority at the workplace. Thorough disaster planning at the 
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worksite, and education of workers, management, and colleagues, assist the OHN 
in preparing others to meet and survive this catastrophe as well. 
L 
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Appendix A 
Office of the Governor 
TERRORISM VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT 
This vulnerability self-assessment is intended to help your organization determine if it is 
vulnerable to terrorism and to assist law enforcement in assessing the overall vulnerability of the 
state. It provides a vulnerability self-assessment worksheet that can be customized to your specific 
organization. The worksheet is intended to be a general guide. It may not include all issues that 
would be considered in your specific situation. Therefore, it is imperative that you consider the 
unique character of your organization: its fimctions, its general public image, and its overall public 
visibility. Consider both who may work in your organization and what your organization does. 
Assess the symbolic value of your organization to the public or within your own industry. This 
assessment does not replace any current reporting requirements. 
Most organizations or activities do not present a likely target for terrorism. Others' 
activities may make them a more likely terrorist target. Answering this self-assessment is a 
subjective process. It should be completed by the person(s) that best knows your organization and 
can best answer the questions. There are no firm guidelines on how to score a category. The 
score can best be determined by the person selected to complete the self-assessment, based on the 
uniqueness of your organization or fucility. Since the questions are subjective, give your "best 
estimate" when scoring each question. 
It is important to remember that the most important threat reduction measure is 
vigilance on the part of your organization's staff, their awareness of anything out ofthe 
ordinary and their prompt communication of that information to your organization's 
security team or management. 
The Vulnerability Self-Assessment will also be used by law enforcement to assist in 
preventing criminal acts committed by terrorists. Preparation of a Threat Vulnerability Self-
Assessment: 
• is required for State agencies and must be provided to the law 
enforcement agency which has primary first responder responsibility for each 
location of an agency office and to the Secretary of the N.C. Department of 
Crime Control and Public Safety; 
• is strongly recommended for local governments and, if completed, should 
be provided to the law enforcement agency that has primary first responder 
responsibility for each location of a local government office; and 
• is strongly recommended for private businesses and should be submitted 
to the law enforcement agency which has primary first responder responsibility 
only if the Threat Assessment level is High Risk or if there are other significant 
factors warranting law enforcement's attention. 
Vulnerability Self-Assessments completed by or provided to State or local government 
agencies will be used to prevent crime and are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records 
l 
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 93 
Law under G.S. 132-1.4. 1breat Vulnerability Self-Assessments in the possession of private 
organizations are not Public Records. Completed Terrorism Vulnerability Self-Assessments 
should he provided to local law enforcement iu hard copy or on digital media. They should not be 
e-mailed. 
Local health departments and hospitals have a dual role iu vulnerability assessment. 
They are both potential targets and have roles iu early detection and control. Unlike the tragic 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a covert bio-terrorism attack may occur undetected, grow 
quietly and spread widely hefore health officials can piece together the chaiu of events. The hest 
defense agaiust bio-terrorism is early detection and prompt public health and emergency response 
to minimize the effect. The local capacity to perforrn the core public health function of disease 
reportiug and surveillance must be assessed and strengthened for North Caroliua to adequately 
protect its citizens and respond to these potentially devastatiug attacks. To be effective, the public 
health assessment must iuvolve a wide range of health care providers iu each county who are 
likely to have the first iudication that a bio-terrorism attack has occurred. 
The Vulnerability Self-Assessment should be conducted at least aunually and agaiu if 
there is an increased threat of a terrorist event or whenever there is a significant change to your 
organization's facilities or activities. 
Each law enforcement agency Sheriff, Chief, or head, or his designated representative is 
requested to review the Vulnerability Self-Assessments they receive and forward to the Secretary 
of the N.C. Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, 4701 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, 
N.C. 27699-4701, all Vulnerability Self-Assessments or other threat reports that they deem to be 
significant or which reveal immediate danger. The data must he submitted by hand or U.S. 
Mail in either digital form or hard copy and must not be submitted by e-mail. 
Local health departments and hospitals are asked to report all vulnerability self-
assessment results to the North Caroliua Division of Public Health Bio-Terrorism Coordiuator, 
Epidemiology Section, 1902 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, N.C. 27699-1902 and with local law 
enforcement. The North Carolina Division of Public Health will provide copies of health related 
Vulnerability Self-Assessments or other threat reports that they deem to be significant or which 
reveal immediate danger to the Secretary of the North Caroliua Department of Crime Control and 
Public Safety. 
Circle your evaluated score on each scale. Then total the scores and enter the total on the 
last page. 
1. Potential Terrorist Intentions 
Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
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• Are you aware of any terrorist threat to your organization?· 
• Are you aware of a history of terrorist activity in your area or your specialty?· 
• Are you aware of the level of capability of any suspected terrorist, which you believe 
poses a threat to your organization? 
2. Specific Targeting 
Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Have you obtained current information from law enforcement or other sources 
that your organization has been targeted by terrorists? 
• What is the reliability of these information sources? 
• What is your organization's public visibility? 
• Does the nature of your organization's activity lead you to think it may be 
targeted? 
• Are there activities that indicate possible terrnrist preparations in your area or 
specialty? 
3. Visibility of your Facility/Activity within the Community 
Low Vulnerability Hil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score 
• Is your organization well known in the community? 
• Do you regularly receive media attention? 
• Is your organization nationally prominent in your field or industry? 
• Is your location and the nature of your activity known generally to the public? 
• Have you ever bad an event or accident with potential health risks that attracted 
public attention to your facility? 
• Does your facility work with animals that may make it a target of radical groups? 
4. On-Site Hazards 
Low Vulnerability Hil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
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Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Are hazardous materials, explosives or other dangerous items on your site? 
• Do you store or use biologic or chemical materials that have the potential to be used 
as a threat or weapon? 
• Do you store or use radioactive material at your site? 
• Do you have a system to control access to hazardous materials, explosives or any 
other dangerous materials at your site? 
• Can any products stored or used on your site be used as, or in the manufucture of a 
mass casualty weapon? 
• Can any products stored or used on your site cause extensive environmental 
damage? 
5. Population of Site/Facility/ Activity 
Low Vulnerability ffigh Vulnerability . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you have more than 250 people normally present at your site? 
• Do you have more than 1,000 people normally present at your site? 
• Do you have more than 5,000 people normally present at your site? 
• Do you hold events at your site that attracts large crowds? 
• Do you conduct public tours of your fucilities? 
6. Potential for Mass Casualties 
Low Vulnerability ffigh Vulnerability · 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do materials stored or used at your site have the potential to create mass casualties 
on-site? 
• Do materials stored or used at your site have the potential to create mass casualties 
within I mile of your site? 
• How many people live or work within one mile of your site: 500; 1,000; 2,000; 
5,000; more than 5,000? 
7. Security Environment & Overall Vulnerability to Attack 
Low Vulnerability ffigb Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Does your organization have effective internal security procedures? 
~--
-,__ 
+----
OHN ROLE IN DETECTING BIOWEAPONS DISEASE OUTBREAK 96 
• What is the law enforcement presence in your area? 
• What is the hardness, level of blast protection, etc. of your facilities? 
• How accessible (security presence, access control, id badges, metal detection buffer 
zones, fences, etc.) is your facility? 
• Are your assets and/or its potential recognized as a symbol? 
• What level of public access is necessary for you to function? 
• Can you control high-speed vehicle approaches to your facility? 
• Do you have access control to your parking area? 
• Do you conduct vehicle searches when entering facility grounds or parking areas? 
• Do you employ detection/monitoring systems (video surveillance, intrusion 
detection systems, etc.)? 
• Is your parking delivery area adjacent to or near your buildings? 
• Is your delivery area supervised during hours of normal business? 
• Is your delivery area access blocked during hours that your business is closed? 
• Do you have an on-site food service facility for employees and visitors? 
• Is access to the water supply for your facility protected? 
• Is access to the ventilation system for your facility protected? 
• Do you have a way to quickly shut down the water supply or ventilation system for 
your facility? 
8. How Critical are your Products of Services? 
Low Vulnerability Bil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• What is the importance of your organization to the community? 
• What is the importance of your organization to your industry? 
• Is your organization critical to the local population, economy or govermnent? 
• Is your organization critical to the continuity of basic services or utilities 
infrastructure in your area? 
• Is your organization critical to state or national commerce? 
• What would be the effects of a terrorist act against your organization? 
• What would be the social, economic or psychological ramifications of a terrorist 
attack against your organization? 
• What is the nature of your assets: hazardous materials, uniqueness, potential danger 
to others, etc? 
• How long would it take to restore your critical services/functions? 
9. High Risk Personnel 
Low Vulnerability Bil!hVulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
l 
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• Do you have personnel that are critical to the continuing fimction of State or local 
government, basic services, utilities infrastructure, the community, the economy, or of 
inherent value to your business or agency? 
• Do you have personnel that are critical for responding to a terrorist act? 
• What would be the effect of a terrorist act against these high risk personnel? 
10. Organization Communications 
Low Vulnerability . Hil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you have a Mass Notification System (public address system, intercoms, 
alarms)? 
• Do you have a secure communications network that can be relied upon during a 
crisis? 
• Do you have a crisis response team? 
• Is your crisis response team trained? 
• Do you conduct regular exercises? 
• Do local/regional emergency responders participate in your exercises? 
• Does your Crisis Response Team have its own portable communications system? 
97 
• Can your Crisis Response Team communicate directly with emergency responders? 
• Do you have an emergency law enforcement notification system such as a hot line, 
panic button or something similar? 
• Is your alarm system tied into the local law enforcement department or do you have 
an alarm service? 
• Are your systems tested regularly? 
11. Security and Response 
Low Vulnerability . Hil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Are your security forces' staffing and training levels adequate? 
• Do you have the capability to maintain a security presence in a high threat 
situation? 
• Are additional security personnel available if requested? 
• Are there affiliated agency/industry/organization support services available? 
• Do you have trained disaster response teams within the organization? 
• Do you have necessary specialty detection, monitoring, hazard assessment devices 
on hand and are they fimctional? 
• Are local/regional law enforcement forces adequate and can they respond rapidly? 
• Are local emergency responders fumiliar with your fucility and its contents? 
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• Do you keep records on who visits your fucility and where they go within the 
facility? 
12.Policy/Procedures/Plans 
Low Vulnerability . . High Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you have a current crisis response/disaster plan? 
• Does your plan include the types of crises you are most likely to encounter (e.g., 
fire, explosion, chemical release)? 
• Are your employees fumiliar with the plan? 
• Have you conducted crisis response and disaster drills and were they effective? 
• Have you identified the critical fimctions of your workplace and do you have a plan 
for continuation of operation during an emergency? 
13. Security Equipment 
Low Vulnerability High Vulnerabilitv · 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you have a security system and is it current technology? 
• Do you have an intrusion monitoring motion detector or an alarm system? 
• Do your systems have back-up if power is cut or fails? 
• Do you have security equipment that would detect leaks or ruptures of potentially 
hazardous materials? 
• Do you have personnel protective equipment for your emergency response team 
appropriate for the hazardous materials at your fucility? 
• Is such equipment in working order and has it been inspected recently? 
14. Computer Security- Cyber-Crime & Cyber-Terrorism 
Low Vulnerabilitv Hil!h Vulnerabilitv 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Cyber-crime, including cyber-terrorism, involves attacks against your organization's 
computer systems and data. 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
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• Is your site dependent on information technology such as computers and networks 
to accomplish its daily business activities? 
• Is the information stored in your computer systems valuable? 
• Do you have back-up power available for your computer systems? 
• Do you make back-up copies of your data? 
• Is your back-up data securely stored? 
• Does your site have computers or networks connected to the Internet? 
• Have you experienced problems with computer security incidents, such as computer 
viruses, worms, web-site defacements and/or denial of service attacks in the past? 
• Do you have staff in place who are adequately trained and are available to monitor 
security warnings and take protective measures, such as loading system patches? 
• Do you have technology security tools in place such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems or anti-virus software to protect your computer systems? 
• Do you have a computer security policy, plan and procedure that includes a 
computer security incident response team? 
15. Suspicious Mail And/Or Packages15. Suspicious Mail And/Or Packages 
Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Is the mail for your fucility opened in a secured area or an area isolated from the majority 
of personnel? 
• Have the personnel who open mail received training on the recognition of suspicious mail 
and/or packages? 
• Do you have specific procedures on how to handle suspicious mail and/or packages, 
including possible facility evacuation? 
• Do you have a secure and contained location where any unusual or suspect deliveries or 
mail can be stored until proper authorities can evaluate the suspect items? 
16. Telephone, Bomb And Other Threats 
Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Has your staff received training on how to handle bomb and other threat calls? 
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• Does your staff have a checklist of questions to ask the caller in case of a bomb or other 
threatening call? 
• Does your facility have a plan on how to handle bomb and other threatening calls? 
• Does your bomb threat plan include a system whereby your personnel would search your 
facility to identizy suspicious objects to point out to emergency response personnel? 
• Does your plan include a decision making process on whether to evacuate the fucility? 
• Are personnel fumiliar with the plan? Have evacuation drills been conducted? 
• Is your plan coordinated with local law enforcement and the local phone company? 
17. Employee Health & the Potential for Bio-Terrorism 
Low Vulnerability · . Hi,;t Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you have an employee occupational health specialist on staff? 
• Do you have an occupational health safety program in place? 
• Do you have a health professional working at your facility? 
• Do you have a procedure in place to track the health of each employee and know if 
more than one employee has the same symptoms? 
• Do you monitor the health status of employees on sick status or absent otherwise? 
• Are employees encouraged to keep supervisors informed on any unusual health 
related event or condition? 
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• Are employees required to report any unusual conditions or substances encountered 
in the course of their normal duties, such as strange substances or odors from packaging 
or mail? 
• Do employees know the proper procedures for emergency operation or shut-off of 
air handler, air circulating or ventilation systems? 
• Do you keep a current list of employees, home addresses and emergency contact 
information? 
• Do you have an emergency notification plan for employees (e.g. calling tree)? 
Note: Sections #18 and #19 are to be completed by Local Health 
Departments 
18. Capacity to Recognize a Bio-Terrorism Event 
Low Vulnerability · Hi~h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
• Do you regularly notizy the state or local health department of all reportable 
diseases and conditions when they occur in your fucility? 
• Do you have personnel trained in recognizing the clinical signs and symptoms of 
potential victims of biologic or chemical events? 
• Do you have a plan for responding to suspected Bio-Terrorism events? 
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• Do you regularly exchange information about unusual symptoms or patterns of 
disease with other health care facilities in your area or the local health department? 
19. Capacitv to Respond to a Bio-Terrorism Event 
Low Vulnerability Hil!h Vulnerability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Issues to be considered in selecting your score: 
Do you have a Bio-Terrorism response plan for your facility? 
• Have you coordinated your Bio-Terrorism response plan with the local emergency 
operations team including law enforcement and other health care fucilities? 
• Do you have a system for knowing the bed (or care) capacity of your facility at any 
given time? 
• Do you have a current inventory of your medical supplies and pharmaceuticals that 
may be required during an emergency event? 
• Do you have a plan for contacting and deploying health care personnel during an 
emergency? 
• Do you have plans for how to best utilize your facility during a mass casualty 
event? 
• Do you have decontamination facilities? 
• Do you have a protocol for treating contaminated patients? 
• Do you have a plan for how to utilize vohmteers from other areas and facilities 
during an emergency? (e.g. Scheduling, Training, Credentialing, etc.) 
Remarks/Unusual or Significant Issues: 
Please list any important remarks you think should be made concerning your self-
assessment. Also, please list any unusual or significant findings that you developed during your 
self-assessment, list significant hazardous materials that might be used as a terrorist weapon or any 
significant impact a terrorist act against your site may cause to the community. 
Attach an additional sheet if necessary. 
Group Performing Self-Assessment: ____________________ _ 
Type of Business/Facility:----------------------
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Contact Person: 
Address: ____________________ _ 
Phone No: ___________________ _ 
Fax No: E-Mail A-d;-;dr_e_ss_: ________________ _ 
(For information sharing ONLY) 
Who is Your Local Law Enforcement Contact? 
You should coordinate with your local law eriforcement agency regarding the results of 
your self-assessment. If your self-assessment indicates that your score is in the 
High Risk category, or if you believe your organization presents significant or 
unusual vulnerability or risk factors, you should provide a copy of this self-
assessment to your local law eriforcement office. 
Total Score: 
Self-Assessment Evaluation: 
Health Professionals Only 
20 Low Risk 85 20 Low Risk 85 
86 Low Caution 170 86 Low Caution 
1171 High Caution 255 171 High Caution 
1256 High Risk 340 256 High Risk 
102 
255 
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BIOTERRORIST AGENTS 
I WATC:H FOR THFSF SYMPTOMS I 
i3 l Disease Signs & Symptoms Incubation Time Person-to-Person Diagnosis '" ..,. ___ Anthrax 
Bacillus anthracis Flu-like symptoms (fever, fatigue, 1to6days None Standard Chest x-ray evidence of 
~ A, Inhalation muscle aches, dyspnea, (up to 6wks) Precautions widening mediastinum; Ciprofloxacin* 500 mg PO q 12h Combined IV/PO therapy for 60d ,, nonproductive cough, headache), obtain sputum and blood Or Doxycycline 100 mg PO q 12h chest pain; possible 1-2 day culture. Sensitivity and Ciprofloxacin 500 mg q 12h :·.· ' '.j :_. improvement then rapid specificity of nasa! swabs Alternative (if strain susceptible Or Doxycycline 100 mg q 12h, ~ .-._ ·- ' respiratory failure and shock. unknown - do not rely on and above contraindicated): AND r .;' . ,·:- , Meningitis may develop. for diagnosis. Amoxicillin 500 mg PO q Sh 1 or 2 additional drugs (vancomycin, f:; -~ -:?L. ! *In vitro studies suggest that rifampin, imipenem clindamycin, 
0 Intense itching followed by 1 to 12 days Direct contact with Contact Peripheral blood smear levofloxacin 500 mg PO q 24h chloramphenicol, clarithromycin, 
~ B. Cutaneous painless papular lesions, then skin lesions may Precautions may demonstrate gram Or Gatifloxacin 400 mg PO q 24h and if susceptible penicillin or 
t/) vesicular lesions, developing into result in cutane-ous positive bacilli on unspun Or Moxif!oxacin 400 mg PO q 24h ampicillin 
<C eschar surrounded by edema. infection. smear with sepsis. could be substituted 
~ Cutaneous anthrax 
t/) Ciprofloxacin 500 mg PO q 12h H 
Ci Or Doxycycline 100 mg PO 12h 
t/) Abdominal pain, nausea and 1 to 7 days None Standard Culture blood and stool. Recommendations same for 
z vomiting, severe diarrhea, Gl Precautions pregnant women and Recommendations same for 
0 bleeding, and fever. immunocompromised persons pregnant women and 
~ immunocompromised persons Afebrile, excess mucus o::l botulinum toxin dysphagia, dry mouth and throat, 12-80 hours Precautions from CDC or Public Health D, E) 0.5 ml SQ may be available health authorities. 8 .es dizziness, then difficulty moving Dept; obtain serum, stool, as investigational product from Supportive care and ventilatory 
I 
eyes, mild pupillary dilation and Foodborne: gastric aspirate and USAMRIID. support. Avoid clindamycin and 
o::l 
"" 
nystagmus, intermittent ptosis, 12-72 hours suspect foods prior to aminoglycosides. 
C) [) . indistinct speech, unsteady gail, (2.jl days) administering antitoxin . 
21 ~ . extreme symmetric descending Differential diagnosis f-; ·. weakness, flaccid paralysis; includes polio, Guillain 
u generally normal mental status. Barre, myasthenia, tick 
~ . paralysis, CVA, 
f-; 
~ 
Ci " chest pain, nausea and vomiting, (2.jl days) aerosols Precautions may be made by Gram, Or Ciproffoxacin 500 mg PO q 12h Or Gentamicin 2 mg!kg, then 1.0 to 
21 Yersinia pestis headache. Advanced disease: until 48 hrs of Wayson or Wright stain of 1.7 mglkg tV q 8h 
~ 
'"·:!I/ purpuric skin lesions, copious effective lymph node aspirates, Alternatives: watery or purulent sputum antibiotic sputum, or cerebrospinal Doxycycline 200 mg PO load, then 0 production; respiratory failure in 1 therapy fluid with gram negative 100 PO mg q 12h 
r:<: .·,-~;..,;·'l,, .,' ---. ;' to 6 days. baci!li with bipolar (safety Or Ciprofloxacin 400 mg IV q 12h 
~ I J variol~ virus J rigors, vomiting, headache, and (7-17 days) nuclei or direct (includes N95 fluid or scab, send to BL-4 4 days). 0 backache. After 2-4 days, skin contact with skin mask) and laboratory. All lesions Vaccinia immune globulin in 
lesions appear and progress lesions or secretions Contact similar in appearance and special cases- call USAMRIID 
uniformly from macules to papules until all scabs Precautions develop synchronously as 301.jjl9-2833. I Potential role for Cidofovir. 
to vesicles and pustules, mostly on separate and fall off opposed to chickenpox. 
face, neck, palms, soles, and (3 to 4 weeks) Electron microscopy can 
subsequently progress to trunk. differentiate variola virus 
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Photo Credds: Anthrax A and C- JAMA 1999;281 :1737-8; Anthrax 8- CDC; Botufism -JAMA 2001;285:1062 Copyrighted 2001 American Medical Association; Plague - JAMA 2000;283:2283; Smallpox- CDC 
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NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN THE EVENT OF A BIOTERRORIST INCIDENT 
1. First call the Public Health Officer at your local health department; after 
hours contact local Health Director via 911. 
2. If criminal activity is suspected, call your local law enforcement and the 
FBI in your state. 
FOR MORE INFORMATION ON BIOTERRORISM: 
CDC - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
www.bt.cdc.gov/ 
APIC- Association for Professionals in Infection Control & Epidemiology 
www.apic.org/bioterror/ 
SPICE - North Carolina Statewide Program for Infection Control and Epidemiology 
www.unc.edu/depts/spicel 
919-966-3242 
USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 
www.usamriid.army.milleducation/bluebook.html 
DECONTAMINATION FOR ALL OF THESE AGENTS 
1. Place clothing from suspected victims in airtight impervious (e.g., plastic) bags and save for law 
authorities (e.g., FBI, SBI). 
2. Use soap and water for washing victim. 
3. For environmental disinfection for all of the above, use bleach (standard 6.0%- 6.15% sodium 
hypochlorite) in a 0.6% concentration (1 part bleach to 9 parts water). For botulism, plague and 
smallpox an alternat~e is to use an EPA-approved germicidal detergent. 
4. For smallpox, all bedding and clothing must be autoclaved or laundered in hot water and bleach. 
5. Healthcare worker should wear PPE (gowns, gloves and mask) during decontamination of anthrax, 
plague, and smallpox. 
DETECTION OF OUTBREAKS 
Epidemiologic Strategies 
• A rapidly increasing disease incidence 
• An unusual increase in the number of people seeking care, especially with fever, respiratory, or 
gastrointestinal symptoms 
• An endemic disease rapidly emerging at an uncharacteristic time or in an unusual pattern 
• Lower attack rate among persons who had been indoors 
• Clusters of patients arriving from a single locale 
• Large numbers of rapidly fatal cases 
• Any patient presentin~ with a disease that is relatively uncommon and has bioterrorism potential 
Chart developed by: 
North Carolina Statewide Program for Infection Control and Epidemiology (SPICE) email: spice@unc.edu 
KK Hoffmann, DJ Weber, EP Clontz, WA Rutala 
In view of the possibility of human error or changes in medical sciences, neither the authors, 
nor the publisher, nor any other party who has been involved in the preparation or publication 
of this work warrants that the infonnation contained herein is in every respect accurate or 
complete. Readers are encouraged to confirm the information contained herein with other 
sources and check d1]!9___2_i:!_C~_c:t9e insert for_wamings and contraindications. 
Support provided by: 
The North Carolina Institute for Public Health and The North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness, in the 
School of Public Health at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
®June 2002 by the Univemity of Norlh Carolina at Chapel Hill. Not to be used for other than non-profit educational purposes without written pe""ission of copyright owner. 
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Appendix C 
Bioterrorism Resources 
Each one of these bioterrorism websites contains valuable information. 
Most of them contain reading lists and/or lists of other resources. 
http://www.aaohn.org/practice/advisories/bioterrorism.cfm 
http://www.apic.org/bioterror/ 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/bioterror.htm 
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org 
http://www.hsl.unc.edu.bioterrorism/ 
http://www.ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/vhf.htm 
http ://www.niaid. nih. gov/ dmid/bioterrorism/ 
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html 
